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THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION: A SELECTIVE HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS
Charles H. Cosgrove*
... it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in
the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1845, antislavery constitutionalist Lysander Spooner ar-
gued that the Declaration of Independence was originally a
legal constitution with a direct bearing on how one ought to
interpret the status of slavery under the Constitution of 1787.2
In 1889, the congressional act establishing the states of North
Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington required that
their state constitutions "not be repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States and the Declaration of Independence,"3 as
if the two documents were of a piece.4 In 1995, attorney Chris-
topher Darden argued to the jury in the O.J. Simpson criminal
trial that slain victims Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald
Goldman had rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness" as stated in the Constitution,5 which is perhaps where
* Professor of New Testament Studies and Christian Ethics, Northern Baptist
Theological Seminary. Ph.D., 1985, Princeton Theological Seminary.
1. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897).
2. See LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONAITY OF SLAVERY 36-39 (1847).
3. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yamika Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463, 479 n.23 (1979).
4. See id.
5. In his rebuttal argument at the close of People v. Simpson, Christopher
Darden told the jury the following story.
I also looked back at the Constitution last night, I sent my clerk to go
get it for me, and I looked through the Constitution, and you know what
I saw? I saw some stuff in the Constitution about Ron and about Nicole,
and the Constitution said that Ron and Nicole had the right to liberty. It
said they had the right to life. It said that they had the right to the
pursuit of happiness.
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many Americans think this famous phrase is found.' Darden's
"mistake" reflects a widespread perception that in some way the
Declaration of Independence does embody the principles to
which Americans are constitutionally committed. Moreover, that
perception is shared by some legal scholars. In fact, throughout
American political history, there have been legal scholars, judg-
es, and other interpreters of our Constitution who have con-
tended that the Declaration of Independence has (or deserves) a
privileged place in constitutional interpretation.7
This study provides a representative history of appeals to the
Declaration of Independence in the interpretation of the Consti-
tution, together with a survey and critique of theories about the
jurisprudential relationship between these two founding docu-
ments. Part II of this article presents examples of appeals to
the Declaration of Independence in judicial interpretation. Part
III examines three theories of the relation of the Declaration to
the Constitution. Part IV proposes that literary critic Frank
Kermode's theory of two kinds of "classics" illumines the differ-
ence between originalist and non-originalist theories of the
authority of the Declaration in constitutional interpretation.
Part V suggests that if the Declaration exercises authority in
constitutional interpretation, that authority is of a "dialogical"
sort.
The Declaration is a "living" document, the authority of
which is best captured by the late-modern concept of a classic.
On these assumptions, I make a soft claim for the place of the
Declaration in constitutional interpretation. The Declaration is
an authority not so much for a particular understanding of con-
stitutional rights as for construing the equal dignity of each
person as a fundamental constitutional value, the meaning of
which derives in part from the shared national ethos of "We the
Christopher Darden, Rebuttal Argument in People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995
WL 704342, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Tr. Sept. 29, 1995).
The closest constitutional phrase appears in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor [shall any person] be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
6. See Ronald R. Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Litera-
ture, Constitution, 58 S. CAL. L REV. 35, 132 (1985) (Garet reports that his under-
graduates think the Declaration is part of the Constitution).
7. See infra Parts H & Il.
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People," who continue to debate the nature and limits of the
rights we regard as basic.
H. A SAMPLING OF APPEALS TO THE DECLARATION IN SUPREME
COURT OPINIONS
Over the course of American judicial history, the United
States Supreme Court has articulated constitutional rights of
liberty' and the pursuit of happiness9 as grounded in the Dec-
laration of Independence. The Court has also referred to the
Declaration in working out, among other matters, the limits of
executive power 0 and military power,' the origins of national
citizenship,' the scope of the right of trial by jury," and the
meaning of equality before the law.'4 An examination of a few
such uses illustrates the variety of ways in which the Declara-
tion has figured in Supreme Court opinions over the last two
hundred years.
A. The Declaration as the Legal Act of American Independence
An early example of appeal to the Declaration in judicial
adjudication is Shanks v. Dupont,5 where Chief Justice Joseph
Story used the Declaration as a legal marker for determining
that a woman born in South Carolina (before the ratification of
Declaration of Independence), married to an English officer, and
returning to England with him after the Revolutionary War to
reside there until her death, was a British subject and not an
American citizen. 6 The Court would have regarded her as an
American citizen had she married a citizen of one of the states
8. See infra Part HI.C.2.
9. See infra Part ILB.
10. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (the Declaration shows that the founders intended to form an
executive of limited powers). The Court cited this portion of Jackson's opinion in
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981).
11. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 37 (1866) (citing Declaration for
the principle of the subordination of the military to the civil power).
12. See infra Part ILA.
13. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968).
14. See infra Parts VA-B.
15. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830).
16. See id. at 244-47.
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and remained in America, as her sister did. 7 This hypothetical
appears to assume the existence of national citizenship between
the Declaration and the ratification of the Constitution.
In his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
Story wrote that
[firom the moment of the declaration of independence, if not
for most purposes at an antecedent period, the united colo-
nies must be considered as belonging to a nation de facto,
having a general government over it created, and acting by
the general consent of the people of all the colonies. 8
Thus, the act of independence created national citizenship,
which had no basis in any antecedent form of nationhood.
Moreover, Story argued, state sovereignty was limited by the
event of independence, from which time Congress had exclusive
authority to act in a range of domestic and international
spheres. 9
There is another aspect of Story's opinion in Shanks that
bears on the Declaration's relation to constitutional law. It is
not clear that Story had in view the declaration as a document.
He may have had in mind only the declaration as an act of
separation, distinct from the document that explained and justi-
fied the act.' Even more significant is the fact that the under-
pinnings of Story's ruling logically require only the legal act of
separation on July 2, 1776, and not anything asserted by the
document of July 4.21 In fact, the document, adopted by the
17. See id& at 244.
18. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARiEs ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 110 (abridged ed. 1987).
19. See idi (Congress had exclusive authority to "declare war and make peace;
authorize captures; to institute appellate prize courts; to direct and control all nation-
al, military, and naval operations; to form alliances, and make treaties; to contract
debts, and issue bills of credit upon national account.").
20. It happens that the term "declaration of independence" does not appear in
Story's opinion with initial capitals. That could mean that he did not intend the
document, which goes by the proper name, "The Declaration of Independence," but
wished to refer merely to the act of independence. But this evidence is not decisive
since we have other examples of judicial reference to the "declaration of indepen-
dence" (in lower case letters), where the document is clearly in view. See, eg.,
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 105 (1872).
21. Legal separation was declared by Congress on July 2, two days before it
adopted the Declaration of Independence. See GARRY WILLS, INVESTING AMERICA:
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Continental Congress two days after its declaratory act, could
not effect an independence already legally declared; it could
only explain it. Hence, one can argue that the document was
never a legal instrument but only a piece of political propagan-
da, which is how Garry Wills interprets its original meaning.'
Nevertheless, as Wills observes, there was an early tendency to
collapse the prior act of separation into the July 4 Declaration.
"[Als the Declaration acquired its popularity, it became the
custom to misread it as both the first enactment (contained in
it) and the later explanation-but principally the former!'
The language of the Declaration encouraged this. Although
speaking technically after the fact, it used the traditional legal
formulary for acts of declaration that effect what they
announce.
24
It may be that Story, too, made no distinction between the
July 2 act of separation and the explanatory document adopted
on July 4. After Shanks, many courts simply assumed that the
Declaration of Independence (the document) effected the legal
independence of the states. Thus, the Declaration acquired legal
significance in the courts for cases requiring, for example, con-
sideration of state rights over the territories,' the rights of
the United States over Indian lands formerly claimed by Eng-
land, and federal versus state power.'
The July 2 declaration was ambiguous from the start since
one could construe it as an act making each of the states sover-
JEFFERSoN's DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 336-37 (1978).
22. See id at 333.
23. Id. at 337 (emphasis in original).
24. "We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in Gener-
al Congress Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the recti-
tude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by the authority of the good People of
these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of
Right ought to be free and Independent States. . . ." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
25. See Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381, 398 (1851) (the Declaration of
Independence and Revolutionary War created common lands among the states rather
than a division of those territories among several states).
26. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584 (1823) (the Declaration
of Independence transferred title, to newly discovered lands in North America, from
Great Britain to the United States).
27. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 439-40 (1849) (federal power over
naturalization and taxation of immigrants superior to that of states).
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eigns or as an act of the united colonies asserting their inde-
pendence from England and, in so doing, establishing them-
selves as a nation. As we have seen, Story adopted the latter
view. Moreover, with the conceptual merger of the document
and the act, the theory that the Declaration created the nation
could take on even greater significance, since one might then
treat the political doctrine of the Declaration as part of the
Constitution that created the nation. That could mean conceiv-
ing the Constitution in the English sense of an unwritten con-
stitution to which certain foundational documents attest," or
conceiving the Declaration as the privileged statement of the
political doctrine to which the Constitution is to give effect.'
In the 1850s, the Republican Party used the theory of the
nation's birth through the Declaration of Independence to argue
that slavery was inconsistent with America's fundamental iden-
tity.0 Abraham Lincoln crystallized this sentiment in the
Gettysburg Address when he dated the national founding to
1776 ("Four score and seven years ago""1) and claimed that
this founding committed the nation to "the proposition that all
men are created equal." 2 Lincoln was not suggesting that
slavery was unconstitutional, only that it contradicted America's
national identity." Nevertheless, some thought that a political
doctrine, although not in the form of a legal provision, could
28. See eg., Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Docu-
ment, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 932-33, 944 (1995); see also Sanford Levinson, Pledg-
ing Faith in the Civil Religion; or, Would You Sign the Constitution? 29 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 113, 125-26 (1987) (contrasting a "Protestant" view of the Constitution as the
actual text of the document with a "Catholic" view of the Constitution as a tradition
consisting of that text along with other fundamental American documents, including
the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address); John Stick, He Doth
Protest Too Much: Moderating Meese's Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 TL.
L. REV. 1079, 1079-80 (1987) ("One can define the constitution as only the words
ratified in 1788 along with all amendments, or one can include our broader political
traditions: Supreme Court decisions, the Declaration of Independence, and the Gettys-
burg Address, as well as longstanding institutional accommodations between the exec-
utive branch and Congress.").
29. See, e.g., infra Parts m.B.1 & 4.
30. See Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of In-
dependence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 361,
378-83 (1993).
31. ABRAHAM Ln COLN: SPEECHES AND WRmNGS, 1859-1865, at 536 (The Library
of America 1989) [hereinafter LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITnGS, 1859-1865].
32. Id.
33. See infra Part IVA.
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have the force of law if found in or presupposed by a legal
instrument.34
B. Language of the Declaration in Judicial Doctrines
The language of the Declaration has also figured in the de-
velopment of specific constitutional doctrines. As Robert Post
observes, "doctrinal interpretation" of the Constitution assumes
that the Constitution has authority as law, meaning a rule that
is stable and reliable. 5 Accordingly, doctrinal interpretation
adheres to the principle of stare decisis, elaborating the Consti-
tution by attending to the precedential chain of cases that de-
fine the state of the law.3' Hence, doctrinal interpretation im-
plies that "the actual text of the Constitution is remitted to one
end of a growing line of precedents." 7 What binds is not the
text per se but the current tests which have evolved through
that line of precedents."M It follows that the only authority that
the language or political theory of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence might possess for doctrinal interpretation of the Constitu-
tion is an authority it enjoys within the chain of precedent.
One way in which the Declaration of Independence has fig-
ured in doctrinal interpretation of the Constitution is through
the development of doctrines formed around certain key phrases
of the Declaration. A notable example is the expression, "the
pursuit of Happiness."s
34. This was the position of the antislavery constitutionalists. See, e.g., SPOONER,
supra note 1, at 43-44 (arguing that self-evident truths have legal force, even when
not expressly stated in the Constitution). Spooner also treated declarations of natural
rights found in constitutions as having legal force. See id. at 46-48.
35. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, ComuUNrY,
MANAGEMENT 30-31 (1995).
36. See id.
37. Id. at 31.
38. Referring to the Establishment Clause, Post observes that
[elven if the very first judicial decision to interpret the establishment
clause had concentrated its attention on the specific words of the clause
or the intentions of its Framers, the practice of doctrinal interpretation
would require the second decision to focus chiefly on the meaning of the
first decision, the third decision chiefly on the meaning of the second,
and so forth.
Id. at 31-32.
39. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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There is a practical illustration of this theory in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases." In 1869, the Louisiana legislature passed an
act granting a twenty-five year monopoly to the Crescent City
Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse Company ("Crescent
City") for the sheltering and slaughtering of animals.4 The os-
tensible purpose of the statute was to protect the health of the
public by confining the slaughtering of animals to a single cor-
poration and the limited locales assigned to it.42 But an effect
of the act was that other butchers in the New Orleans area had
no other choice but to pay for slaughtering at the Crescent City
abattoir.' It appears that, as a result, the livelihoods of a
"thousand butchers" were jeopardized." The butchers chal-
lenged the legislation on the grounds that it violated the Thir-
teenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities, Due
Process, and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution.45
The United States Supreme Court upheld the statute, but the
decision was split 5-4." In what would become the first of a
series of influential dissents, Justice Field defended the
butchers' right to practice their trade, arguing that the Four-
teenth Amendment "was intended to give practical effect to the
declaration of 1776," in which "the pursuit of happiness" ap-
pears as one of those rights that "the law does not confer, but
only recognizes.' 7 The pursuit of happiness, Field urged, en-
tailed the right to follow any of the ordinary occupations of
life.48 Hence, the state statute granting a monopoly to a fa-
vored few butchers violated the constitutional right of other
butchers to pursue their chosen occupation.49
40. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (Field, J., Bradley, J., and Swayne, J., dis-
senting).
41. See id. at 59-60.
42. See id. at 59.
43. See id. at 59-60.
44. See id. at 88-89.
45. See id at 66.
46. See id. at 111.
47. Id. at 105.
48. See id. at 105-06.
49. See ii In 1879, the Louisiana legislature repealed the act, and Crescent City,
maintaining that this repeal was a breach of the original legislative contract, sought
an injunction against slaughterhouses that had resumed business. Butchers' Union
Slaughter-House, 111 U.S. 746 (1884), was decided against Crescent City, with Jus-
tices Field and Bradley writing separate concurring opinions in which they invoked
the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting the rights enumerated by the Declaration of
114
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Field's laissez-faire theory of the law gained constitutional
currency toward the end of the nineteenth century when "the
rejected dissents of Mr. Justice Field gradually established
themselves as the views of the Court."0 In this way, the doc-
trine of substantive due process was born with a particular
construal of the Declaration's natural rights philosophy serving
as its content. This meant reading the Due Process clause as
an enactment of the rights theory of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. However, no part of the text of the Declaration was
incorporated into the Constitution as law except in the attenu-
ated sense that the phrase "pursuit of happiness" came to stand
for a constitutional doctrine.
The rhetorical device by which bits of the Declaration have
come to stand for constitutional doctrines is synecdoche, a part
standing for a whole (e.g., "daily bread," where bread stands for
the meal as a whole)."1 But in this case, the part (the right to
the pursuit of happiness) stands not for the original whole to
which it belonged (the political tenets of the Declaration of
Independence) but for a new whole, to which it has been relo-
cated. That new whole is the constitutional doctrine of laissez-
faire that we associate with the Lochner era. 2 Moreover,
Field's opinion would inspire litigants in the first half of the
twentieth century to mine the "pursuit of happiness" doctrine
for other specific rights, including "opium smoking, carrying a
pistol, the sale of liquor by municipalities, the use of trading
stamps, the sale of contraceptives, the spraying of citrus fruit,
the sterilization of imbeciles, and the licensing of plumbers."'
In Loving v. Virginia,"M the United States Supreme Court
struck down an anti-miscegenation law in part on the ground
that "freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
Independence, including a right under "the pursuit of happiness" to engage in the
common occupations. See id. at 754-66 (Field, J. and Brady, J. concurring).
50. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution, 41 HARV. L. REV.
121, 141 (1927).
51. See, e.g., JA. CUDDEN, A DIenONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 676-77 (rev. ed.
1976).
52. See, e.g., PAUL KENS, JuDIcIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY
OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK (1990).
53. HOWARD MUMFORD JONES, THE PURSuIT OF HAPPINESS 47 (1953) (citations
omitted).
54. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men."55 This formulation recalled the Court's lan-
guage in Meyer v. Nebraska," where the Court also found a
Due Process right to freedom of marriage.57 Meyer cited the
Slaughter-House Cases and Butchers' Union." Liberty, said the
Court,
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.59
Meyer did not identify where in the older common law one
might find a general right to pursue happiness. Certainly the
concept was not original to the Declaration of Independence.
The phrase "the pursuit of happiness" and similar formulations
were widely used before Jefferson,' ° who himself claimed he
was setting down common sense opinions.61 But since the
Meyer Court did not adduce a history of the formulation in
common law, it probably meant that the common law, by pro-
tecting various personal liberty interests, had, in effect, recog-
nized a general right to the pursuit of happiness. By the time
of Meyer, that right was most closely associated in American
law with the Declaration of Independence. Moreover, the pres-
tige of the Declaration necessarily attaches to that right both in
Meyer and in the some 160 other federal cases in which the
expression "orderly pursuit of happiness" appeared."2 In these
cases, the courts have developed an evolving concept of the
right to pursue happiness. The Declaration supplies not the
55. Id. at 12.
56. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
57. See id. at 399.
58. See id. (citations omitted).
59. Id.
60. See WILLS, supra note 21, at 240-47.
61. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in THOMAS JEF-
FERSON: WRITINGS 1501, (MERILL D. PETERSON ED., 1984).
62. According to a natural language search for the phrase "orderly pursuit of hap-
piness" on WESTLAW for ALLFEDS and ALLFEDS-OLD.
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conception but the mere phrase concept backed by the
Declaration's authority as a national symbol.
HI. THEORIES OF THE RELATION OF THE DECLARATION
TO THE CONSTITUTION
A number of nineteenth and twentieth century constitutional
interpreters have theorized about the place of the Declaration
in constitutional law. We can also tease out implicit theories
from certain appeals to the Declaration in constitutional inter-
pretation. These theories range from claims that the Declara-
tion is itself a kind of fundamental or constitutional law to
claims that the Declaration sets forth principles that should
guide constitutional interpretation. We will begin by exmining
the idea of the Declaration as law.
A. The Declaration as Law
We noted that the courts initially treated the Declaration as
law in one specific sense, that is, as the legal act severing the
states from the British crown. A strand of constitutional inter-
pretation eventually developed that accorded the Declaration a
much more expansive status as law. Some antislavery advocates
argued that the political doctrines expressed in the Declaration
had the status of law.
During the antebellum period, the antislavery movement
divided into three camps over differing interpretation of the
Constitution. Followers of William Lloyd Garrison and the
American Antislavery Society denounced the Constitution as "a
covenant with death" and "an agreement with hell.' ° Other
abolitionists took a more moderate view, contending that the
constitutional provisions sheltering slavery were necessary com-
promises that conflicted with the Constitution's principal com-
mitments to liberty and equality, and that the Constitution
(and the Supreme Court's interpretations of it) could be used in
modest ways to combat or at least limit slavery and its atten-
dant laws and practices." Finally, the radical antislavery
63. See WUA MK WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISL&VERY CONSTrUTONAUSM
IN AMERICA 1760-1848, at 228 (1977).
64. See generally id at 202-27; Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and
1171997]
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constitutionalists contended that the Constitution, properly con-
strued, was antislavery, that it permitted slavery only as a
temporary expedient, and that it gave Congress the power, at
least after 1808,' to abolish slavery in all the states."
1. Commonwealth v. Ayes
A famous 1863 case reflects the efforts of a moderate anti-
slavery constitutionalist judge to limit the claims of slave own-
ers in the non-slaveholding state of Massachusetts. Common-
wealth v. Ayes" involved a slave girl voluntarily brought into
the State of Massachusetts by her master's wife. The case is in-
triguing, although also murky, in its conception of the Declara-
tion as law in relation to the states as sovereigns and as consti-
tutionally-bound subjects of an American nation.
In Ayes, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, writing for the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, ruled on whether a citizen of a
slaveholding state, who brings a slave into Massachusetts with
the intention of returning with the slave to the slaveholding
state, can restrain the slave for that purpose.' Shaw held that
the slave owner had no such authority. 9 In reaching this deci-
sion, Shaw considered the status of slavery under Massachu-
setts law and in other jurisdictions,7" the obligations of comity
between the states, 1 and whether the Fugitive Slave Clause of
the United States Constitution72 required Massachusetts to
honor the slave owner's claim on a slave who had not escaped
but was brought freely into Massachusetts by the slave own-
er.7" Shaw found that slavery was abolished in Massachusetts
before the adoption of the Constitution.74 Shaw speculated that
Northern State Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of a Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 CIVIL WAR
HISTORY 5 (1979).
65. The Constitution provides that Congress shall not prohibit the importation of
slaves into the United States prior to 1808. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
66. See WIECEK, supra note 63, at 255, 270-71.
67. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836).
68. See id. at 207.
69. See id. at 224.
70. See id. at 207-17.
71. See id. at 217-18.
72. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
73. See Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 218-24.
74. See id at 208.
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slavery may have been abolished, by the State's adoption of the
English common law ruling in Somerset's case, 5 by the Decla-
ration of Independence, 76 or by the declaration of rights con-
tained in the Massachusetts constitution of 1780.
77
Shaw's speculation that the Declaration of Independence may
have abolished slavery in Massachusetts is remarkable since
the Declaration was an act of the confederated colonies, some of
which were and remained slaveholding. Nevertheless, Shaw did
not mean that the Declaration may have abolished slavery in
all the states, since he recognized slavery as legal in the slave
states." It is, therefore, unclear exactly how Shaw conceived
the Declaration as having a different effect on slavery in Mas-
sachusetts than in Louisiana or Virginia. Shaw may have as-
sumed that each of the states, as sovereigns,"9 had the right to
appropriate the Declaration of Independence for itself, according
to its own interpretation of the import of that document, for its
own law. One state could not impose an interpretation of the
Declaration on another state; the judiciary of each state would
have the right to determine the legal significance of the Decla-
ration for its state and its state alone.
In deciding Ayes, however, Shaw found no need to rule on
whether the Declaration abolished slavery in Massachusetts
because he was able to construe the Massachusetts constitution
as having abolished slavery in Massachusetts. ° Interestingly,
Shaw arrived at this conclusion by construing a portion of the
constitution's political language, cast in indicative state-
ments, l because there were no express formulations abolishing
slavery in the Massachusetts constitution. As quoted by Shaw,
the relevant political language read as follows: "All men are
born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and
unalienable rights, which are, the right of enjoying and defend-
ing their lives and liberties, that of acquiring, possessing, and
75. See idU at 209. Shaw was referring to Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499
(K.B. 1772) (holding that a slave became free when he was brought by his master
into England, where slavery had not been established by positive law).
76. See Ayes, 35 Mass. (18. Pick) at 209.
77. See id.
78. See id- at 217.
79. See id. at 220.
80. See id. at 209-10.
81. See id. at 210.
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protecting property."82 The similarity between this political
exordium and that of the Declaration of Independence, together
with Shaw's willingness to treat such a prefatory statement of
political doctrine in a legal instrument as legally binding, prob-
ably explains Shaw's speculation that the Declaration of Inde-
pendence itself may have abolished slavery in Massachusetts in
1776.83
2. The Declaration in the Antislavery Constitutionalism of
Alexander Spooner
Radical antislavery constitutionalists argued that a proper
reading of the Constitution indicated that slavery was unconsti-
tutional' and claimed that the Declaration had an indepen-
dent standing as law that the Constitution did not supersede,
but rather incorporated.'
An example of such antislavery constitutionalism can be
found in the jurisprudence of Lysander Spooner who contended
that the Declaration of Independence was a legal consti-
tution." Moreover, Spooner argued that if the Declaration was
law, its principles were also law. 7 Therefore, if the Declara-
tion was lawful "even for a day," it freed every slave in
America."
82. Id. at 210. An earlier Massachusetts case had already appealed to this same
language to make the same argument. See WIECEK supra note 63, at 46-47 (citing
Commonwealth v. Jennison (1783, unreported)). The relevant portion of the opinion in
this case is reproduced in PAUL FINKLEMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A
CASEBOOK 36-37 (1986).
83. Evidently, Chief Justice Shaw did not subscribe to the view that the Declara-
tion of Independence and the preamble to the Constitution cannot be law because
they do not command. Others have taken the position that political preamble3 to
constitutions and statutes have no force as law. See, e.g., Patrick M. (YNeil, The
Declaration as Ur-Constitution: The Bizarre Jurisprudential Philosophy of Professor
Harry V. Jaffa, 28 AKRON L. REV. 237, 239 (1995) (reviewing HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGI-
NAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTriUTON: A DISPUTED QUESTION (1994))
("Laws often have prefatory statements prefixed to them, but no necessary logical
relationship exists between the facts and values asserted in any preamble and the
contents of the law it introduces.") (emphasis omitted)).
84. See generally WIECEK supra note 63, 249-75.
85. See id. at 264-65.
86. See SPOONER, supra note 2, at 42.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 37.
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Spooner assumed that law is fundamentally natural law.8 9
He also appears to have thought that once natural law was
converted into positive law (enacted law), the intentions of the
natural law itself should control, not the intentions of the draft-
ers or ratifiers. Spooner nowhere argues this explicitly, but it
seems to be the implication of the force he gives to the princi-
ples of natural law and the explicitly textualist
(nonintentionalist) hermeneutic that he adopts from Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall's opinion in Ogden v. Saunders.9"
ia Odgen, Marshall wrote that in construing the Constitution,
"the intention of the instrument must prevail; that this inten-
tion must be collected from its words; that its words are to be
understood in the sense that they are generally used by those
for whom the instrument was intended."91 Spooner theorized
that if the language of natural law is made part of a legal
instrument, the conventional understanding of that language
should control and not any contrary intentions that the drafters
may have had. Seen in this light, the Declaration was the occa-
sion for the egalitarian principles of natural law to gain a foot-
hold in the enacted law of the nation created by the Declara-
tion, regardless of whether its drafters or signers intended it to
have any effect on slavery. This logic would explain Spooner's
contention that, regardless of the intentions of the founders, the
Declaration freed every slave in America and the Constitution
never revoked this legal emancipation, despite the fact that this
law of the Declaration went unenforced.
Spooner further defended the widespread view that slavery,
as against natural law, cannot lawfully exist except by express
positive law.92 He argued accordingly that those who defend
89. According to Spooner, natural law is the paramount law, and there can be no
law, properly speaking, that is not natural law. See id. at 8; see also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 2 at 63 (William Carey
Jones ed., 1916) (The natural law is 'superior in obligation to any other. [N]o human
laws are of any validity, if contrary to this."). Walter Murphy observes that other
statements by Blackstone are not entirely consistent with his position that natural
law supersedes any enacted law contradicting it. See Walter F. Murphy, The Art of
Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing, in ESSAYS ON THE CoNSTrTUTION
OF THE UNrrED STATES 130, 139 (M. Judd Harmon ed., 1978).
90. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213 (1827).
91. See SPOONER, supra note 2, at 82 (citing Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (emphasis in original)).
92. See id. at 70. Spooner specifically stated:
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the constitutionality of slavery must show that, after the adop-
tion of the Declaration (which freed the slaves), the Constitu-
tion expressly established slavery.93 Without such an express
establishment, slavery, as against natural law, is unconstitu-
tional.
3. The Declaration in the Antislavery Constitutionalism of
George Anastaplo
Today, few find any merit in the antislavery constitu-
tionalists' interpretation of the Constitution. 4 But George
Anastaplo5 has recently defended the view that the Constitu-
tion of 1787 was indeed inherently antislavery in its aspira-
tions, if not directly antislavery in its provisions. According to
Anastaplo, the Declaration of Independence and other founding
documents and traditions embody a constitutional tradition that
gives the Constitution its intended meaning.' Thus, from the
1774 adoption of the Articles of Association until the adoption
of the Constitution, Americans conducted themselves according
to a "constitutional system implicit in the Declaration of Ide-
pendence. Furthermore, the Constitution incorporated the
basic principles of the Declaration, including the theory that
government derives its authority from the consent of the gov-
erned and has as its end the protection of inalienable human
The rule of law is materially different as to the terms necessary to legal-
ize and sanction any thing contrary to natural right, and those necessary
to legalize things that are consistent with natural right. The latter may
be sanctioned by implication and inference; the former only by inevitable
implication, or by language that is full, definite, express, explicit, un-
equivocal, and whose unavoidable import is to sanction the specific wrong
intended.
Id. (emphasis in original).
93. See id. at 43.
94. For a recent argument that the Constitution of 1787 was unambiguously a
proslavery compact, see PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND
LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 1-33 (1996). Wiecek takes a more moderate view,
arguing that while the Constitution included provisions for the protection of slavery,
its overall approach to slavery was ambiguous and susceptible to antislavery interpre-
tations. See WIECEK, supra note 63, at 17, 18, 247-48.
95. See GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A COMNTARY (1989).
96. See id. at 11 (Along with the Declaration, this larger constitutional tradition
includes the Articles of Confederation, statutes enacted under the Articles (such as
the Northwest Ordinance), the British Constitution, and the common law.).
97. Id. at 3.
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rights.9" Hence, "[t]he Constitution of 1787 can plausibly be
taken... as an incarnation of the principles revealed in the
Declaration of Independence."9
Anastaplo recognized that the Constitution of 1787 was
"deeply flawed" in its compromise with slavery; yet it contained
principles that were antislavery and granted powers that could
be marshaled to the ultimate extinction of slavery."® The Con-
stitution was inherently antislavery in its commitment to the
Declaration's vision of human equality and republican govern-
ment.' °' Moreover, the Commerce Clause granted Congress
the power (after 1808"G2) to curtail slavery to the point of ex-
tinction."c The original powers of the Commerce Clause were
sufficient to regulate the incoming slave trade, the slave trade
between the states, and the general influence of slavery on the
commercial life of the nation.' From this interpretation of
the principles of the Constitution and the powers it confers on
Congress, one can infer that the non-use of these powers to
break up the institution of slavery owed more to the bad faith
of the American people than to any inherent constitutional
restraints. If I understood Anastaplo correctly, he thinks that
slavery might have been abolished without any constitutional
amendments.
We can better assess Anastaplo's interpretation of the origi-
nal Constitution by conducting the following experiment in
thought. Suppose that a majority of the slave states had, by the
98. See id. at 14, 22.
99. I& at 22.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 177. In this regard, Anastaplo wrote:
It was no accident then that the decided majority of the people shaped
by the Constitution of 1787 should have become, if they were not from
the outset, so "dedicated to the proposition that all men are created
equal" that they were eventually willing and able to make great sacrific-
es in behalf of strangers among them held in bondage by fellow citizens
whose material interests had blinded them to their ancient republican
faith.
Id.
102. See ANASTAPLO, supra note 95, at 64.
103. See id. at 64-65.
104. See iUL at 64. Among Anastaplo's arguments is the contention that the twen-
ty-year international slave trade guarantee implies a broad commerce power. The
clause should be read as a curtailment of a power that was merely to lie dormant
until 1808. See id- at 64-65.
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1850s, abolished slavery of their own accord. Suppose further
that the presidency during the antebellum years had been dom-
inated not by proslavery or slavery-indifferent executives and
congressional leaders, but by antislavery presidents and legisla-
tors, and that the Supreme Court during those same years had
likewise been dominated by antislavery justices."5 Suppose as
well, that the phrase "We the People" had embraced the theory
that the Declaration be treated as the privileged guide to the
theory of government enshrined in our Constitution. Suppose
finally, that only one or two intransigent states remained
slaveholding by 1855.
Under these historical conditions, had Congress enacted legis-
lation effectively abolishing slavery in all the states, the Su-
preme Court could have mustered the requisite constitutional
arguments to uphold that legislation against attack by the
holdout states. What appeared at the time like farfetched con-
stitutional arguments by the radical antislavery would have
been far more plausible and compelling had they been made
under the radically different historical conditions we have just
fantasized. Anastaplo's original Constitution is the unrealized
potential of the Constitution in just such a world that might
have been, but was not.
B. The Declaration in Originalist Interpretation of the
Constitution
Current debate about the use of the Declaration in constitu-
tional interpretation has been provoked largely by theorists
advocating an originalist hermeneutic." Originalism assumes
that the binding sense of the Constitution is the original mean-
105. On the domination of pro-slavery interests in the Executive Office, Congress,
and the Supreme Court during the antebellum period, see WILLIAM LEE MILLER,
ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATrLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 13
(1996).
106. See WALTER BERiNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY (1987); SCoTr D.
GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1995); JAFFA, supra note 83. An originalist approach ap-
parently also informs Dennis J. Mahoney's argument that the Declaration is founda-
tional to the Constitution. See Mahoney, The Declaration of Independence as a Consti-
tutional Document, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 54-68
(Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987).
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ing of its text or the intentions of those who framed and adopt-
ed it. Robert Post suggests that this assumption in turn
presupposes "the equation of constitutional authority with con-
sent.""° The authority of the Constitution is the compact be-
tween the people when they adopted the Constitution."° Thus,
originalists regard this original agreement as constitutionally
binding in the way a promise is binding. For some, the original
terms of the constitutional compact reside in the text itself, for
others in the original public understanding of its language, and
for still others in the intentions of its framers.110
In 1987, then Attorney General Edwin Meese rallied conser-
vatives to originalism in a highly publicized speech to the
American Bar Association."' Some of those who today advo-
cate interpreting the Constitution in the light of the Declaration
share Meese's views about method in constitutional interpreta-
tion, even if they do not reach the same conservative results
that he does. One such person is Harry Jaffa.
1. The Originalism of Harry Jaffa"
Jaffa agrees with Meese that the Constitution lies in its
original intent, but he disputes Meese's conception and con-
struction of that intent."' According to Jaffa, the original in-
tent of the founders are the moral and political principles that
guided them (their general intent), not "their personal judgment
about contingent matters.""4 The Declaration of Independence
states these principles."' Moreover, unlike other statements of
the founders' philosophy, the Declaration is a privileged author-
ity for establishing constitutional principles because it is "the
107. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980).
108. POST, supra note 35, at 32.
109. See i
110. See id, at 33.
111. See Edwin Meese I, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE CON-
STITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
112. Jaffa's most important essays on constitutional jurisprudence are gathered in
JAFFA, supra note 83.
113. See id. at 55-73.
114. Id. at 42.
115. See id. at 23, 43.
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fundamental legal instrument attesting to the existence of the
United States."1 ' As such, the Declaration identifies and au-
thorizes the constitutional subject; "We the people of the United
States."117 Hence, the Declaration is "the most fundamental
dimension of the law of the Constitution.""8 According to
Jaffa, the core philosophy of the Declaration is a republicanism
based on belief in universal equality and natural rights, indi-
cating that the original Constitution was fundamentally com-
mitted to equality and opposed to slavery."9  The
Constitution's provisions for slavery gave that institution only
"a temporary security."' Hence, one must distinguish the
principles of the Constitution from its prudential compromis-
es. 2' Jaffa wants judges to interpret the Constitution in the
light of the human rights philosophy of the founders and, thus,
to act as checks on legislatures when legislative acts violate
fundamental rights.' Jaffa, however, opposes modern liberal
judicial activists, such as William Brennan, because they do not
show fidelity to the natural law views of the founders.'
2. Jaffa and Dred Scott v. Sandford
Jaffa contends that the fathers of conservative originalism
are Southern statesman John C. Calhoun and Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney.' In examining Taney's infamous opinion in
Dred Scott v. Sandford,' Jaffa treats Taney as an originalist
who sought the meaning of the Constitution's attitude toward
slaves through his mistaken interpretation of the Declaration of
116. Id. at 23.
117. Id.
118. Id. Similar claims are made by Lewis Lehrman in a foreword to a collection
of Jaffa's essays. See Lewis Lehrman, On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, and Original In-
tent, in JAFFA, supra note 83, at 4. Lehrman argues that the appearance of the Dec-
laration at the head of the statutes-at-large of the U.S. Code attests its status as the
primary document of the organic law of the United States. See id. at 4-5.
119. See JAFFA, supra note 83, at 39-43, 67-71.
120. Id. at 43.
121. See id. at 28-29, 293-94.
122. See id. at 62.
123. See id. at 41, 49, 62.
124. See id. at 13-14, 16, 22, 26-28. For a lucid summary of Jaffa's views on this
point, see Bruce D. Ledewitz, Judicial Conscience and Natural Rights: A Reply to
Professor Jaffa, in JAFFA, supra note 83, at 110-111.
125. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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Independence.' A close look at Taney's opinion, however,
suggests that he was not an originalist and did not regard the
Declaration as decisive for constitutional interpretation.
In Dred Scott, the Taney Court addressed two questions.
First, the court addressed whether a slave had standing to sue
for his freedom, where the slave was carried by his Missouri
master into a free state, was then taken by his master two
years later from that free state into one of the territories where
slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise, and who
subsequently was brought by his master back to Missouri.'
Second, the Court addressed whether that slave could claim his
freedom on the ground that he became free when he entered
the free territory.'
Before we consider the place of the Declaration in Taney's
argument, we must examine Taney's interpretation of the Dec-
laration. Taney maintained that by using the phrase "all men
are created equal," the framers of the Declaration had in view
only those individuals belonging to civilized governments, there-
by excluding Africans as uncivilized peoples.' Taney further
contended that the framers "perfectly understood the meaning
of the language they used, and how it would be understood by
others."' He conceded, however, that the words themselves
"would seem to embrace the whole human family" and "if they
were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so
understood."1"' This concession admitted too much. Long be-
fore Taney and Jefferson, the English language used the gener-
ic term "man" to denote the human being as such, not some
narrow class of so-called civilized persons. If Taney was correct
about the intentions of the framers, then perhaps they spoke
too extravagantly; thinking of persons like themselves-and not
of blacks-they intoned the equality of "all men." If the framers
did not say what they meant, then the Declaration itself carried
a meaning beyond the framers' intent.' 2
126. See JAFFA, supra note 83, at 27.
127. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 400, 403, 430-32.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 410.
130. Id
131. Id.
132. One could say that the founders' language carries a "public meaning." Under-
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Taney also elided an important logical distinction between
the premises of the Declaration's assertion of independence and
that assertion itself. "[I]t is too clear for dispute," he wrote,
"that the enslaved African race were not intended to be includ-
ed and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted
this declaration .... "" Nevertheless, whoever "the people"
were who were referred to in the Declaration, they asserted
universal human equality as the premise of their right to inde-
pendence.
We turn now to consider how Taney conceived the relevance
of the Declaration to the case of Dred Scott. Taney appealed to
the Declaration in the first part of his opinion, where he
addressed the question of Dred Scott's standing to sue in
federal court. In order to bring suit, Scott had to be a citizen of
the United States within the meaning of the Constitution.'M
To show that Scott was not a citizen of the United States,
Taney argued that slaves did not become citizens of the United
States at the adoption of the Constitution and that there had
been no change in the status of slaves since the Constitution's
adoption." Taney's proof led him to examine the assumptions
of the framers, and of (white) Americans generally, about the
identity of the people who declared themselves independent
from the British crown in 1776 and united under the consti-
tution of 1787.3" His comments about the Declaration served
this inquiry. Taney's discussion of the founders, however, was
only the first step in an argument he carried forward in time to
show that no different understanding of blacks or of citizenship
had evolved in the history of constitutional interpretation to
offset the original understanding.1 7 An originalist would not
find it necessary to make that sort of argument. Moreover,
unlike Jaffa, Taney did not treat the Declaration as having any
legal force in constitutional interpretation. Taney appealed to
stood according to conventional linguistic conventions, it asserts a universal equality
that is not racialized, although it may be gender focused.
133. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 410.
134. See id. at 406.





the Declaration as no more than a piece of relevant historical
evidence about the founders' intentions in framing the Constitu-
tion.
3. The Originalism of Walter Berns
Walter Berns also adopts an originalist approach in arguing
that the Declaration should enjoy a determinative place in
constitutional interpretation. Berns highlights the promissory or
contractual vision of the Constitution. Taking a cue from James
Madison, Berns distinguishes two American compacts: one an
original and unwritten compact and another, the Constitution,
following as a second written instrument of the original com-
pact.' In Berns's scheme, the Declaration is not itself a com-
pact but has a privileged status as the explanation of the un-
written original compact."3 9 This relation between the Declara-
tion and the original contract warrants interpreting the Consti-
tution "by reference to the Declaration."
14°
Berns quotes with approval some remarks by Abraham Lin-
con on the relation between the Declaration and the Constitu-
tion:
The expression of that principle [liberty to all], in our Decla-
ration of Independence, was most happy, and fortunate....
The assertion of that principle, at that time, was the word,
"fitly spoken" which has proven an "apple of gold" to us.
The Union, and the Constitution, are the picture of silver,
subsequently framed around it. The picture was made, not
to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve
it. The picture was made for the apple-not the apple for
the picture. 4'
According to Berns, explaining the Constitution by reference to
the Declaration requires interpreting the original intent of the
138. See BERNS, supra note 106, at 24-26.
139. See iL at 23-25 (writing that the Declaration, as organic law, defines the
political constitution of the people who formed the first unwritten compact).
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id at 18-19 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the Constitution and the
Union, in 4 THE CoLLEcTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 169 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953) (all emphases in original)). Lincoln's extended metaphor plays on the trope of
Proverbs 25:11.
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Constitution from the original intent of the Declaration as a
statement of classical liberal philosophy of a Lockean and
Hobbesean variety.142 The resultant constitutional intent en-
tails recognition of fundamental natural rights, among which
are the rights of self-government,' freedom of conscience,' 4
and property.'" Using this approach, Berns also defends a
conservative agenda for a limited judiciary. Specifically, he sup-
ports curtailment of what he sees as a liberal judicial activism
that converts certain liberal values and interests into constitu-
tional rights, thus subverting the democratic process.'
4. The Originalism of Scott Gerber
According to Scott Gerber, the correct politics of constitution-
al interpretation is the natural law philosophy of the founding
era.'47 More specifically, the Constitution should be construed
in the tradition of the natural law philosophy "expressed with
unparalleled eloquence.., in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence."' The Constitution is the instrument designed to
achieve the ends announced by the Declaration,49 namely, "to
secure natural rights."5 °
Gerber quotes with approval Felix Frankfurter's remark that
constitutional interpretation "is not at all a science, but applied
politics."' Gerber, therefore, calls for a liberal originalist 52
approach to the Constitution guided by what Gerber takes to be
the classical (Lockean) liberalism of the founders."5 The im-
portance of that liberal philosophy in constitutional adjudication
owes to the generality of the language of the Constitution. For
142. See BERNS, supra note 106, at 161, 241, 246.
143. See id. at 152.
144. See id. at 160-61.
145. See id. at 225-26.
146. See id. at 204-08, 229-30.
147. See GERBER, supra note 106, at 2-3.
148. Id. at 7.
149. See id. at 59.
150. Id. at 6.
151. Id. at 2 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, in LAW
AND POLITCS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938, at 3, 6
(Archibald Mac Leish and E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939)).
152. See id. at 6-8.
153. See id. at 23-56.
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example, the First Amendment provision that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion," the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments," the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws," and many other constitutional phrases
are ambiguous."M "They can be given meaning and life,"
Gerber explains, "only when they are construed in light of the
moral and political principles upon which they are based."
Gerber justifies his brand of originalism in basically three
steps. First, the original natural rights philosophy is an appro-
priate context to give specific content to the generalities of the
Constitution." Second, any other interpretative context or
framework (e.g., a modem liberal theory) is inappropriate be-
cause the choice of any different context must necessarily be
subjective.157 Third, given that subjectivity, it does not seem
fair, and is contrary to the founders' original intent, that
"unelected and life-tenured judges" should read their own mod-
em political and moral philosophy into the Constitution." In
short, the problem with modernization is that it "is uncontrolled
by the text of the Constitution and the political philosophy
upon which the text and this nation are based."
159
5. A Critique of the Originalism of Jaffa, Berns, and Gerber
The approaches of Jaffa, Berns, and Gerber suffer from three
weaknesses. First, they fail to adequately defend an originalist
method of constitutional interpretation. Second, each has a
tendency toward historical oversimplification. Third, they all
make naive assumptions about the nature of interpretation.
Jaffa makes no defense of an originalist methodology, per-
haps because his purpose is to persuade originalists to a differ-
ent conception of originalism.1 ° According to Gerber, the basic
154. Id. at 7.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 6-7.
157. See i& at 8.
158. Id
159. Id. at 9.
160. The title of Jaffa's book, ORIGINAL INTENT, and the title of the main essay of
that book, What Were the Original Intents of the Framers of the Constitution of the
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appeal of originalism is that it alone "'can give us law that is
something other than, and superior to, the judge's will."161 In
this way, originalism is supposed to honor the democratic pro-
cess. Gerber never explains how originalism respects democracy
if the current generation must be bound to the political philoso-
phy of a long extinct generation of founders."2 Nor does
Gerber show that the founders' philosophy is in fact "the politi-
cal philosophy upon which the text and the nation are
based."'
Berns comes closer to articulating the assumptions of the
originalist approach by speaking of the Constitution as a con-
tract. But he also fails to explain why this contract, whose
authorial subject is a "We the People" existing across many
generations, must be construed strictly in terms of the original
intents of the founding generation. Even when dealing with a
contract made between living parties, intent does not always
control. Where there is a conflict of interpretations, a court may
resort to other considerations, such as standards of reasonable-
ness, conventional linguistic usage, fair play, public interest,
and so forth."M
The originalism of Jaffa, Berns, and Gerber also tends
toward oversimplification in historical reconstruction. Their
common claim that the Declaration is a Lockean document
obscures the complexity of influences on not only Jefferson as
drafter but on the Congress that adopted the Declaration.6
They also oversimplify the history leading to the framing of the
Constitution."
United States?, reflect this orientation. See JAFFA, supra note 83.
161. GERBER, supra note 106, at 4 (quoting Robert IL Bork, Original Intent and
the Constitution, 7 HUMANITIES 22, 26 (1986)).
162. Post makes this same point about what he terms the "historical" (originalist)
approach in constitutional interpretation. See POST, supra note 35, at 34-35, 338 n.53
(citing Brest, supra note 107, at 225-26).
163. GERBER, supra note 106, at 9.
164. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 244-61 (1990).
165. See Wendy Ann Semel, Note, Defender of the Natural Rights Faith, 105 YALE
L.J. 1427, 1430 (1996) (reviewing GERBER, supra note 106, and discussing the histori-
cal oversimplifications in GERBER, supra note 106).
166. See id. at 1430-31. For a historian's judicious discussion of the "perils of
originalism," see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-22 (1996).
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Judging whose intent counts and what those intents are
when it comes to establishing the original intent of the Consti-
tution presents an additional difficulty. One can limit the scope
of intent to that of the framers (i.e., the delegates to what be-
came a constitutional convention). Nevertheless, the People's
understanding during the ratification process would appear to
be just as relevant.16 Moreover, Congress itself sealed the re-
cords of its debates until 1818, an act that at least one delegate
urged to forestall "a bad use" of the debates." The quintes-
sential framer, James Madison, whose notes are the standard
guide to the debates, insisted that "[a]s a guide in expounding
and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the debates
and incidental decisions of the [Philadelphia] Convention can
have no authoritative character."' 9 Evidence of original intent
of this kind forces the originalists into the contradictory posi-
tion of making original intent authoritative when at least some
(if not most) of the framers themselves intended to block inves-
tigations of their intent, preferring to let the document speak
for itself.
Furthermore, whichever set of intentions we might choose,
we immediately confront insurmountable problems of data gath-
ering. It has been estimated, for example, that Madison's notes
represent only ten percent of the proceedings of the constitu-
tional convention.7  Recently, Philip Kurland and Ralph
Lerner compiled a five volume collection of sources pertinent to
the founders' understanding of the Constitution.1  Boris
Bittker remarks that a perusal of this mine of information
"reveals that the founders' intent does not have the constituen-
167. Madison thought that the Constitution did not arrive at its true meaning un-
til the ratification process, when it was imbued with the living voice of the people.
See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796), quoted in Boris L Bittker, The Bicentennial of
the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 CAL. L. REV. 235, 264
(1989).
168. See Bittker, supra note 167, at 260 (quoting delegate King).
169. Id. at 264 (quoting letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15,
1821), reprinted in 3 LErrES AND OTHER WRITN Gs OF JAMES MADISON 228 (1865)).
170. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1, 34 (1986), cited in Bittker, supra note 167,
at 263.
171. See THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrUTON (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
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cy of homogenized milk" but "is more like a well-stocked pantry
waiting for an imaginative chef."'72
Consideration of the state ratification conventions raises
other obstacles. Bittker details a number of them to serve as
illustrations. The vote of a state convention delegate in favor of
the Constitution did not necessarily mean that that delegate
agreed with the reasons espoused by his colleagues for adop-
tion.73 And many of the delegates were bound by their con-
stituencies before the ratification debates. 74 Hence, the ratifi-
cation debates at the convention are largely irrelevant and mis-
leading as guides to the "intent" of the delegates who cast their
votes for the Constitution. Moreover, it would appear that in
such cases one needs to establish not the intent of the dele-
gates but the intent of those who elected them.' 5 Gerber
seeks to overcome these difficulties by contending for the
framer's general intent instead of their specific intent. Gerber
assumes that everyone shared basically the same Lockean natu-
ral-rights political philosophy, 78 a dubious assumption.
There is the further problem of showing from history that the
Constitution, produced after the Revolutionary War, was meant
to embody the principles of the Declaration. We must, therefore,
attend to not one, but two sets of original intents. Each set
(that of the Constitution and that of the Declaration) must be
historically reconstructed. Both intents must be correlated with
each other to achieve a convincing demonstration that a com-
mon view prevailed from 1776 to 1787. There is, however, very
scant evidence from the time of the framing and ratification
that anyone was thinking of the Constitution as an extension of
a political theory announced in the Declaration.' In fact, the
172. Bittker, supra note 167, at 251.
173. See ia at 266-67.
174. See id. at 269.
175. See /U
176. See GERBER, supra note 106, at 12-15. On Gerber's assumption that the
reigning natural-rights philosophy was Lockean, see id, at 40.
For a brief survey of competing theories about what political philosophy(ies)
reigned in late eighteenth-century America, see BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF
AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLriCAL THOUGHT
xiii-ixx (corrected printing, 1996). In the body of his study, Shain argues persuasively
that Protestant communalism was dominant among non-elites of the founding era.
177. See Philip F. Detweiler, The Changing Reputation of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence: The First Fifty Years, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 557, 568-64 (1962).
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Declaration suffered an obscure and uninfluential history dur-
ing the first decades after its promulgation.17 Plausible argu-
ments can also be made that, by the time of the Constitution,
many of the founders had undergone significant changes of
mind since the heady and idealistic days of 1776.179 One can
also argue that some of the founders merely adapted their rev-
olutionary rhetoric to popular egalitarian sentiments in an
effort to rally the colonists to revolt."8 This makes the view
even more plausible that these same founders adhered to their
own less egalitarian sentiments when the power was in their
hands to frame the postwar government.
Finally, as the preceding also suggests, originalism requires
an implausible view of the interpretive process. Berns states
that "there is nothing obscure about that text [the Constitu-
tion], or nothing so obscure as to defy a search for its true
meaning.""' Gerber maintains that "it is quite feasible to un-
derstand what [the framers] intended at the basic level of philo-
sophical principle-that embodied in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence." 2 Yet, the later controversies among the framers
over the meaning of the Constitution show that there were
profound differences of opinion about what the Constitution
meant. A famous example is the early disagreement between
Madison and Jefferson over whether the United States Supreme
Court had the power under the Constitution to find an act of
Congress unconstitutional." 3
The same problem of interpretive disagreement attaches to
original understandings of the Declaration. Jaffa assumes that
the founders affirmed racial equality."' Even if that is so,
such a theory does not tell us what kind of racial equality the
178. See id
179. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBLIC
1776-1787, at 519-24 (1969). Gerber is aware of the longstanding debates about
whether the founders' philosophy(ies) of government underwent significant transfor-
mation between 1776 and the constitutional convention, but he relegates comment on
these debates to a dismissive footnote. See GERBER, supra note 106, at 224 n.13.
180. See CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT & JOHN LOUIS LUCA1TES, CRAFING EQUALlT!:
AMERICA'S ANGLO-AFICAN WORD 27-29 (1993).
181. BERNS, supra note 106, at 240.
182. GERBER, supra note 106, at 12.
183. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the doc-
trine of judicial review).
184. See JAFFA, supra note 83, at 46-48.
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founder subscribed to whether it was the minimalist under-
standing of equality that Jefferson approved," or what is ar-
guably a more expansive view espoused by the later Republican
party," or the unqualified equality that Black abolitionists
heard in the Declaration. 87 More specifically, it is difficult to
judge what a Lockean understanding of the phrase "all men are
created equal" might mean. Garry Wills explains that some
Lockeans interpreted human equality (equality "at birth") to
mean that all human beings start out life as blank slates with
the same inherent potential.se It is difficult to determine how
far Lockeans were willing to extend this idea. Adam Smith, for
instance, claimed that
[t]he difference of natural talents in different men is, in
reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very dif-
ferent genius [aptitude or ability] which appears to distin-
guish men of different professions, when grown up to matu-
rity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the
effect of the division of labour.1'
185. In one of his rare discussions of blacks, Jefferson stated that in "[endow-
ments] of the heart' nature "will be found to have done them [negroes] justice."
JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 269. It appears that in Jefferson's view, black moral
equality with whites entitled them to freedom, but not to a share in the American
social compact, since he saw the two races as inherently too different and as sharing
too bitter a history to compose one people. Hence, blacks and whites would be best
off if blacks lived as a self-governing people in a colony separate from America. See
id. at 264.
186. See generally Reinstein, supra note 30, at 392-410.
187. Black abolitionists frequently quoted the egalitarian assertion of the Declara-
tion of Independence to argue the nation's commitment to full racial equality. See
CONDIT & LucAr'ES, supra note 180, at 85, 288 n.95. For example, in 1831, a group
of blacks gathered in New York City to protest the organization of the American
Colonization Society. A portion of their joint address went as follows:
A difference of color is not a difference of species. Our structure and
organization are the same, and not distinct from other men; and in what
respects are we inferior? ... We are content to abide where we are. We
do not believe that things will always continue the same. The time must
come when the Declaration of Independence will be felt in the heart, as
well as uttered from the mouth...
1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 109 (Her-
bert Aptheker ed., 1979).
188. See WILLS, supra note 21, at 208-10.
189. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 15 (Random House 1937) (emphasis added).
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This remark probably suggests a levelling tendency of a
Lockean sort, but it is not clear how "equal" Smith thought
human beings were in raw natural capacities, or whether he
even pretended to know.
C. The Living Declaration and the Living Constitution
A third approach to the place of the Declaration in constitu-
tional interpretation treats the Declaration as a privileged
guide to constitutional principles and values, but regards both
the Declaration and the Constitution as living documents whose
meanings evolve over time.
We begin with the notion of the living, or adaptable, Consti-
tution. According to Supreme Court Justice William Brennan,
the "genius of the Constitution rests.., in the adaptability of
its great principles to cope with current problems and current
needs."' Robert Post calls Brennan's brand of "responsive in-
terpretation," which Post characterizes as the view that con-
stitutional adjudication "must ultimately be accountable to
contemporary concepts of value." 9'
According to Post, the authority of responsive interpretation
is an ethos emanating from American national identity as a
whole. Post refers to Oliver Wendell Holmes' dictum that the
judge must consider a case "in the light of our whole experience
and not merely of what was said a hundred years ago."' 2 By
the same token, the authoritative ethos of the Constitution is
not, for Post, simply a current set of values.'93 The ethos of
the Constitution warrants responsive interpretation according to
"general ends that have been closely linked over the long run to
190. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITIMON supra note 111, at 27.
191. POST, supra note 35, at 35. Others have termed the modernizing approach
"noninterpretivism" because, in adapting the Constitution to current needs, it reaches
outside the four corners of the text. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DIMrUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
192. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), quoted in PosT, supra note 35,
at 35.
193. See, POST, supra note 35, at 36.
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a historical instantiation of national identity."' That identity
has authority over us because it is our identity.95
The concept of a constitutional authority of national ethos
suggests that the Declaration of Independence, as a defining
symbol of that ethos, has bearing on constitutional interpre-
tation. As our understanding of the Declaration evolves, it
rightly shapes the way in which we read our living Constitu-
tion. Among contemporary constitutional interpreters who ap-
pear to hold some version of this view are Charles Black,"
Justice William Brennan,"' and Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
19
1. Charles Black and the Constitutional Right to Livelihood
Charles Black's'" conception of the place of the Declaration
in constitutional interpretation seems to make most sense if
Black regards the Declaration as a living guide to a living Con-
stitution.
Like Jaffa, Black sees the Declaration as law, "our one legal
instrument on which all else rests."2' ° But he is willing to ac-
cept the "minimal 'lesser included case' that the Declaration
asserts rights that are "irrevocable without national humilia-
tion" and that constitute at least "a binding gloss on the 'rights
retained by the people,' found in the Ninth Amendment 2°'
and the "privileges and immunities" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
Black's method for identifying unenumerated constitutional
rights utilizes the Declaration and the preamble of the Consti-
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
197. See discussion infra Part m.C.2.
198. See id.
199. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of
Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1103 (1986) [hereinafter, Black, Justice of Livelihood];
Charles L. Black, Jr., "One Nation IndivisibleS.• Unnamed Human Rights in the States,
65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 17 (1991) [hereinafter Black, Unnamed Rights].
200. Black, Unnamed Rights, supra note 199, at 27.
201. Id. at 38; see generally Stephen D. Hampton, Sleeping Giant: The Ninth
Amendment and Criminal Law, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 349 (1991).
202. See Black, Unnamed Rghts, supra note 199, at 38.
138
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
tution as touchstones.2" By this route, Black makes out a
case for "a constitutional justice of livelihood, " which he also
describes as "a constitutional right to a decent material basis
for life"25 and "the right to be rescued from poverty."' Ac-
cording to Black, this right is implied as a necessary precondi-
tion of "the right to the pursuit of happiness."' 7 Black
analogizes to Benjamin Cardozo's argument in Palko v.
Connecticut' that freedom of speech is an essential right,
"the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other
form of freedom.' ° Black reasons that if this is so, then we
should consider that "the rights to freedom from gnawing hun-
ger and from preventable sickness" may also be constitutional
rights because they, too, belong to the indispensable matrix of
freedom.21
According to Black, the warrant for turning to the Declara-
tion and the preamble of the Constitution is that they are the
best places to start a search for fundamental rights." More-
over, even if one does not approve of using the Ninth Amend-
ment as a constitutional justification for identifying
unenumerated constitutional rights, the Declaration and the
preamble to the Constitution are the obvious places to start a
search for those "fundamental values" that should inform our
understanding of due process and guide our determination of
"suspect classifications" under the Equal Protection clause.2"
We ought to regard the Constitution the way we look at a will
or a contract and seek its fundamental values just as we look
for the basic purposes of any other legal instrument."= That
will lead us back to the Declaration as "the organic act that
203. See Black, Justice of Livelihood, supra note 199, at 1104-05.
204. Id. at 1104.
205. Id. at 1105.
206. Id. at 1108.
207. Id. at 1106.
208. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
209. Black, Justice of Livelihood, supra note 199, at 1110 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S.
at 327). Cardozo's argument is considered a paradigm of substantive due process rea-
soning. See Brennan, supra note 190, at 30.
210. Black, Justice of Livelihood, supra note 199, at 1110.
211. See id. at 1105.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 1107.
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made us a separate nation."214 The Declaration is "a state-
ment of our nation's goals and reason for being."15
These arguments give Black the appearance of an originalist.
Yet, it is apparent that Black is ready to deduce, from the fun-
damental values of the founders, rights not thought of by the
founders and perhaps inconceivable to them, for example, the
right to livelihood. Further, Black does not argue from original
intent to a constitutional right to livelihood. He makes no in-
quiry into the general or specific intentions of the founders; he
does not seek to establish any plausible original meanings of
the founding documents. Instead, he focusses rather
ahistorically on the texts of the Declaration and the Constitu-
tion, elaborating his interpretations by analogizing to other doc-
trinal constructions of unnamed constitutional rights. This sug-
gests that Black takes the Declaration as binding authority for
constitutional interpretation without claiming that the original
meaning of the Declaration is what controls.
Three aspects of Black's conception of constitutional adjudica-
tion reinforce the impression that he takes a nonoriginalist
approach to interpreting the Declaration of Independence. First,
according to Black, constitutional law has, at its disposal, vari-
ous methods for going beyond the text: the method of analogy,
the method of inference from textual structure, and the method
of following precedent. 16 Since these methods may, even when
used in good faith and with technical competence, produce dif-
ferent results, 17 one should judge between interpretive options
by exercising "disciplined and insightful choice amongst the
competing values and expediences, marshaled and structured as
best they may be."1 8  As Black explains in a very
nonoriginalist comment, "we now know (whether or not people
knew in 1787) that the judge who decides the cases under law
cannot avoid making-and acting upon-judgments of justice,
morality, expediency, fitness."219
214. Id. at 1108.
215. Black, Unnamed Rights, supra note 199, at 37.
216. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW: THE 1979 HoLMES
LEcTuRES 23 (1981).
217. See id.
218. Id. at 24.
219. Id. at 26 (emphasis in original).
140 [Vol. 32:107
1997] CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 141
Second, justification for the enormous power that the judicia-
ry enjoys in our system cannot be the original ratification of
the Constitution (in 1788)' or even a "fictitious or mystical
'popular consent,' not expressed in a positive way by the
people's elected representatives."22' The power of the judiciary
can be justified only if "Congress, representing the democracy
from year to year, right now in 1981 could seriously diminish
this allocation of policy power to tenured judges, and has in-
stead chosen, and still chooses, not to do so.' Black thinks
that Congress does have this power over the courts,' which
implies that by not exercising its power to retract or limit the
judiciary's authority to enlarge the sense of the Constitution
through doctrinal interpretation, "We the People," through our
elected representatives, have in effect been tacitly affirming and
reaffirming year by year the idea of a living constitution creat-
ed by the Supreme Court. If that is the case, William
Brennan's notion of "contemporary ratification"' may have a
basis in the constitutional relationship of the Congress to the
courts.
Third, Black emphasizes that original intent is not the stan-
dard for identifying unnamed rights in the Ninth Amend-
ment.' The Ninth Amendment is couched in language that
suggests it refers to rights not thought of or not fully agreed
upon, making the intent of the drafters as to specific rights
beside the point for identifying and judging the constitutionality
of unspecified rights.' Moreover, the Ninth Amendment
seeks to protect any rights of the people, not just those the




223. According to Black, because Congress has the power to determine to a large
extent the matters over which the courts have jurisdiction, Congress could exercise
this pbwer to limit the Court's interpretive power. See BLACK supra note 216, at
37-39.
224. Brennan, supra note 190, at 23 (in the title of Brennan's address).
225. See Charles L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in
BLACK, THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 186, 190-91 (1986).
226. See id. at 191.
227. See id.
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It follows from these three points, especially from the third,
that Black, in regarding the Declaration as a source for identi-
fying the unnamed rights of the Ninth Amendment, could not
mean that the Declaration is to be read on originalist terms.
No doubt Black approaches the Declaration as he does the
Ninth Amendment. In that case, the Declaration, too, ought to
be elaborated by the method of analogy, inference from struc-
ture, and perhaps even inference from "precedent" in the sense
of inference from the meanings the judiciary, or Americans in
general, have come to invest in the Declaration.
2. The Living Declaration as Interpreter of the Living
Constitution in the Jurisprudence of William Brennan and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg
The phrase "living Constitution7 is usually associated with
Justice William Brennan, who used it to suggest that the
meaning of the Constitution evolves as Americans seek better
to define, from generation to generation, human dignity as the
central value of the Constitution. According to Brennan, "[t]he
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, solemnly committed the United States to be a country
where the dignity and rights of all persons were equal before
all authority."' Moreover, one ought to interpret the Consti-
tution on the premise that its fundamental meaning is the
aspiration inherent in this commitment to do justice to the
dignity of the person.' This method of interpretation requires
that one construe what Brennan calls "the majestic
generalities"" of the Constitution from the perspective of a
larger constitutional tradition, symbolized by the Declaration of
Independence (but also stretching back to the Magna
Carta"), which must also be inherently adaptable. Hence, it
is a living Declaration that informs a living Constitution in the
adaptation of the Constitution to the questions of the day.
228. Brennan, supra note 190, at 23.
229. See id at 28, 31-34.
230. Id at 23. Brennan borrowed this language from Justice Robert Jackson. See
id. at 27 (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
231. See Brennan, supra note 190, at 23.
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A similar conception is found in the jurisprudence of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. During the Senate confirmation hearings
on her appointment to the Supreme Court, Ginsburg seemed to
suggest that the ideals of the Declaration of Independence are
evolving concepts, such that the general idea of equality found
in the Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment now warrant equal rights
for women.' This view assumes that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporates the second paragraph of the Declaration of
Independence. Further evidence that Justice Ginsburg makes
this assumption is found in her dissent in Sandin v.
Connor,' where she argued that the liberty interest of pris-
oners in state penitentiaries ought to be based uniformly on the
Due Process Clause, and not defined ultimately by prison codes,
because "[l]iberty that may vary from Ossining, New York, to
San Quentin, California, does not resemble the 'Liberty' en-
shrined among 'unalienable Rights' with which all persons are
'endowed by their Creator.' 4
IV. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AS A
NATIONAL CLASSIC
When originalist Clarence Thomas' or non-originalist Ruth
Bader Ginsburg' invokes the authority of the Declaration in
construing the nature and scope of a constitutional right, each
is doing what one of their predecessors on the Supreme Court
declared was always a wise approach: "It is always safe," said
Justice Brewer, "to read the letter of the Constitution in the
spirit of the Declaration of Independence." 7 If that sentiment
should strike most Americans-if not most constitutional theo-
232. See Excerpts from Senate Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1993, at A12.
233. 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234. I& at 489. Ginsburg also appeals to a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens.
See id. at 489-90 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976)) ("I had thought
it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the
cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws and
regulations.").
235. See infra Part V.B.
236. See supra Part III.C.2.
237. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897).
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rists-as a sound principle of interpretation, it is largely thanks
to the quasi-constitutional status that Lincoln's presidency be-
stowed on the Declaration. Whatever the practical and theoreti-
cal problems with using the Declaration as a guide to interpret-
ing the Constitution, the plausibility of doing so owes largely to
Lincoln's legacy, which elevated the Declaration to the status of
founding charter and national classic.
A. Abraham Lincoln on the Declaration and the Constitution
Lincoln regarded the egalitarian doctrine of the Declaration
of Independence as "the great fundamental principle upon
which our free institutions rest.' 2 In the First Inaugural, he
argued that the Union was considerably older than the Consti-
tution, having been founded by the Articles of Association in
1774 and "matured and continued by the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.' 9 The aim of the Constitution was not to create
the Union but to perfect it.' By the Gettysburg Address, Lin-
coln was ready to fix the birth of the nation at the Declaration
and thus to contend that from its inception, the Union had
been dedicated to the Declaration's universal egalitarianism."
As we have seen, Lincoln also argued that the purpose of the
Constitution was to secure the right to liberty which the Union
recognized in the Declaration as a universal right.' In these
respects, Lincoln was in agreement with the radical antislavery
constitutionalists." Unlike them, however, Lincoln held
that by our frame of government, that principle [of equal
freedom] has not been made one of legal obligation; that by
our frame of government, the States which have slavery are
to retain it, or surrender it at their own pleasure; and that
238. ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1832-1858, at 822 (Library of
America, 1989) [hereinafter LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGs, 1832-1858].
239. LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, supra note 31, at 217-18.
240. See id. at 218 (quoting the preamble to the Constitution).
241. See LINCOLN, Address at Gettysburg, in LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRrrINGS,
1859-1865, supra note 31, at 536.
242. The principle of liberty to all in the Declaration of Independence and the
Union dedicated to that principle is the "apple of gold" preserved by the Constitution
as in a "silver picture frame." 4 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN, supra note 141, at 169.
243. See supra Part 111A2.
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all others-individuals, free-states and national govern-
ment-are constitutionally bound to leave them alone about
it. 244
According to Garry Wills, the words of Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address "remade America."245 Henceforth, we Americans would
read the Constitution as an effort to fllfill the ideals of the
Declaration of Independence and would understand our consti-
tutional system as committed to universal human equality."
With qualification, Wills' thesis is compelling. The Civil War
did remake America, and the Gettysburg Address canonized
Lincoln's executive interpretation of the relation between the
Declaration and the Constitution because we Americans came
to regard the Gettysburg Address as one of our national classics
and as the noblest interpretation of the meaning of the Civil
War. Yet, this constitutional remaking involved more than rein-
terpretation; it also entailed three amendments to the Consti-
tution that radically changed both the nature of the Constitu-
tion247 and the identity of "We the People.' The Republi-
cans, who controlled the Presidency and Congress in the post-
war era, achieved in significant measure their goal of incorpo-
rating the ideals of the Declaration into the Constitution, most
notably in the Fourteenth Amendment.249
It was, therefore, not the words at Gettysburg by themselves
that refashioned us. Something far greater was necessary; the
war and a refashioned Constitution remade America. That Con-
stitution, together with the People who amended it and who
were in turn reconstituted by it, was dedicated to equality in a
way the first Constitution of 1787 never was.
244. LINCoLN: SPEECHES AND WRTINGS, 1832-1858, supra note 238, at 822-23.
245. See GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETmYsBURG: THE WORDs THAT REMADE AMER-
ICA (1992).
246. See i& at 37-40, 146-47.
247. See U.S. CONST. amends. Xm-XV.
248. "We the People" would, henceforth, include the slave population, made irre-
vocably free by the Thirteenth Amendment outlawing chattel slavery, and made citi-
zens "of the United States and of the States in which they reside" by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
249. See generally Reinstein, supra note 30.
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Yet, we still hold to the myth ° propounded at Gettysburg
that the Declaration gave birth to our nation and is a founda-
tion of our constitutional law. The only way to defend that
myth as true is to show that we can now plausibly read the
original Constitution the way the radical antislavery
constitutionalists read it. Their reading was dubious because
the nation had not yet embraced the Declaration as constitu-
tionally defining; nor had the nation yet adopted the meaning
of the Union as taught by Lincoln and established by the Civil
War. Today, we stand on different national assumptions and
those different assumptions change the way we can plausibly
read the original Constitution. Paradoxically, we can now con-
strue that original Constitution, the living text, not simply a
representation of the framers' intents,"' as enshrining the
ideals of the Declaration of Independence and we can now find
that the original Constitution grants to Congress the power to
make laws commensurate with those ideals.
"We the People" might have agreed, without going to war,
that the Declaration of Independence is the privileged guide to
constitutional interpretation, and much antislavery argument
was designed to coax the nation into accepting that view. 2
Had antebellum America been receptive, constitutional condi-
tions might have evolved to make radical antislavery
constitutionalism genuinely reasonable. But by the time the
Civil War had changed our world forever, it was more prudent
to amend the Constitution than to reinterpret it by completing
the reinterpretation Lincoln began at Gettysburg. Nevertheless,
after the war, further antislavery reinterpretation was a genu-
ine hermeneutical option. Congress could have passed legisla-
tion providing for the immediate or gradual extinction of slav-
ery throughout the states,' and the United States Supreme
250. Wills calls Lincoln's reinterpretation a "giant (if benign) swindle." WILLS, su-
pra note 245, at 38. Lincoln
altered the document [the Constitution] from within, by appeal from its
letter to the spirit .... [H]e performed one of the most daring acts of
open-air sleight-of-hand ever witnessed by the unsuspecting .... The
crowd [at Gettysburg] departed with a new thing in its ideological lug-
gage, that new constitution Lincoln had substituted for the one they
brought there with them.
Id.
251. See supra Part LI.C.
252. See supra Part HILA2.
253. Congress might have enacted a law modeled on state law provisions for the
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Court might have upheld challenges to such legislation, crafting
an antislavery constitutionalism under the leadership of Chief
Justice Salmon P. Chase, who Lincoln appointed to replace
Taney.' Assuming that political conditions had been condu-
cive and Chase had been amenable, the Chase Court might
have ruled that slavery was no longer constitutional, deeming
the provisions for slavery in the Constitution a set of
protections for what was, after the war, a constitutionally obso-
lete status. It might have buttressed this view with some of the
arguments of the more radical antislavery constitutionalists.
Such antislavery constitutional interpretation would have been
just as plausible as many other subsequent Supreme Court
doctrines, such as the expansion of the powers of the federal
government under the Commerce Clause or the discovery of a
right of privacy in the Constitution. If antislavery
constitutionalism seems implausible to us, it is only because the
Court never developed an antislavery doctrine by availing itself
of the arguments at hand favoring it. In any event, the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment obviated that line of doctrin-
al development.
B. The Declaration as Classic in Constitutional Interpretation
Lincoln's use of the Declaration of Independence bestowed an
executive imprimatur on the notion that the Declaration is our
national charter and not merely a symbol of national inde-
pendence. As national charter, the Declaration is also a nation-
al classic, if we define classics as "those texts, events, images,
persons, rituals and symbols which are assumed to disclose
permanent possibilities of meaning and truth."' The Declara-
gradual extinction of slavery, such as the gradual emancipation statutes of
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The Pennsylvania statutes are reprinted in
FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 42-47. The operative language of the New Jersey act
is quoted in State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 371 (1845).
254. See JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGmAmY 373-75 (1995). Chase es-
poused moderate antislavery constitutionalism, holding that: (i) Congress had the
power to exclude slavery from the territories and should do so (slavery being against
the laws of nature), (ii) that slavery did not exist legally where it had not been es-
tablished by positive law, (iii) that the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution
provided for a state and not a federal power, and (iv) that the Fifth Amendment
guarantee of due process applied not only to federal, but also to state action, and
therefore to state actions involving slaves. See id. at 62-63, 68-69, 89, 147 (1995).
255. DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND THE
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tion as classic is thus a "model or criterion" =5 for our national
identity and commitments. As Frank Kermode points out in his
celebrated study of the literary classic, the classic as a model
assumes the authority of some revered past and further
assumes that this treasured past "can be more or less immedi-
ately relevant and available, in a sense contemporaneous with
the modern.' 257
Kermode's study is in part a meditation on T.S. Elio's fa-
mous essay, What Is a Classic?,"5 in which Eliot defined the
classic as the expression of the maturity of a civilization. 9
Kermode dubs Eliot's conception the "imperial" view.' The
classic in this sense is possible because it draws on a rich tra-
dition of language and culture that has reached a stage of full
development. The classic displays an amplitude of vision and
understanding that breaks the bounds of its own original time
and place."c In this way, the classic "express[es] the maxi-
mum possible of the whole range of feeling which represents
the character of the people who speak [its] language"' and
may even speak universally to people of other cultural-linguistic
traditions (the universal classic).2 3
Where Eliot is concerned to discover the moment when a
tradition reaches maturity in a work of literature, Kermode is
intrigued with the way in which such a work "retains its
identity" at the hands of future generations of readers, "without
refusing to subject itself to change."' For Eliot, the universal
classic is unsurpassable, an imperium sine fine ("empire without
end7).2' But in the modern view of the classic, Kermode sug-
gests, this unsurpassability owes paradoxically to the classic's
CULTURE OF PLURALISM 68 (1981).
256. FRANK KERMODE, THE CLASSIC: LITERARY IMAGES OF PERMANANCE AND
CHANGE 15 (1975).
257. Id. at 15-16.
258. In SELECTED PROSE OF T.S. ELIOT 115 (Frank Kermode ed., 1975).
259. See id at 116.
260. See KERMODE, supra note 256, at 15, 25, 42, 45, 140.
261. See ELIOT, supra note 258, at 116, 121-22.
262. Id. at 127-28.
263. See id at 116, 128 (referring to the universal classic).
264. KERMODE, supra note 256, at 45.
265. Compare id. at 25 (describing Eliot's characterization of the eternal classic in
Virgil's language of the eternal empire) with iUL at 45 (proposing to explain, without
mythologizing, the classic's capacity to effect its own permanence by changing).
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susceptibility to reinterpretations which allow the classic to
change while retaining its identity.'
Kermode uses the term "modern" for what some might call a
"postmodern" or "late-modern" view that texts are inherently
unstable, deriving their sense not only from the structure of
their own signs but also from the constructive activity of read-
ers.17 Moreover, the imperial view that Kermode ascribes to
Eliot might be classified as "early modern," since it owes much
to the Renaissance recovery of ancient Greek and Roman liter-
ary traditions that moderns came to call "classics." The
postmodern or late-modern view of the classic retains from the
imperial view the idea that the classic is time-transcending, but
only in the sense that the classic persists by the power of rein-
terpretation. One might say that the classic never becomes
obsolete insofar as it continues to surpass its own prior mean-
ings as new generations of readers explore the surplus of its
signs.
1. The Declaration as Classic: An Imperial View
The Declaration of Independence is certainly not a literary
classic in Eliot's or Kermode's use of that term; nevertheless, it
functions for many Americans as a political classic. In that
case, botl Eliot and Kermode's definitions of the classic may
shed light on claims made about and in the name of the Decla-
ration in constitutional interpretation. Consider the claim of
originalist thinkers. Post may be correct that the historical
approach often assumes an authority of the Constitution based
on the notion of original consent.2" However, one might better
account, however, for the historical approach of Gerber or Jaffa
on the theory that they regard the Constitution as an effort to
effect the vision of a political classic in Eliot's sense: the Decla-
ration of Independence as the product of a mature Anglo-Ameri-
can political tradition, one that rests on a profound understand-
266. See id. at 45, 140-41.
267. On this conception of the reader's role in the construction of a text's meaning,
see infra note 331.
268. On the notion of a semantic "surplus," see KERMODE, supra note 256, at
139-40.
269. See supra Part II.B.
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ing of the nature of the human being and succeeds in express-
ing a political vision commensurate with the kind of persons we
are. That would also explain how these originalists see the
relation of the Declaration to natural law, namely, as express-
ing a vision of human society ordered rightly according to the
nature of the human being. For them, the Enlightenment tradi-
tion represented by the Declaration was a mature tradition that
understood human nature and its implications for government.
If this is how we ought to read Gerber or Jaffa, then they
are not so much originalists as classicists, since it is not priori-
ty in time but maturity of understanding and expression that
makes for authority in their conception of constitutional inter-
pretation. In this imperial brand of classicism, one accords pre-
cedence to the original meaning of the Constitution not because
the founding generation had the power to bind all future gener-
ations to its own contract with government, but because the
founding was a classical moment. This would explain why Jaffa
goes to such trouble to show that the original constitutional
provisions for slavery are anomalous within the original Consti-
tution itself."' Jaffa wants to maintain that the original Con-
stitution enshrined "truths 'applicable to all men and all
times,"' 7 a thesis to which the Constitution's protections of
slavery gave the lie unless one could argue, as Jaffa does, that
the Constitution assumed the principles of the Declaration and
protected slavery only out of temporary expediency with a view
to its abolition.
272
2. The Declaration as Classic: A Late-Modern View
Bruce Ledewitz remarks that Jaffa's 'implied prescription for
conservatives is to accept an antiquated natural rights outlook,
and for liberals, to abandon the search for a modern one.'
This criticism assumes that the founding moment was not clas-
sical in Eliot or Jaffa's sense. The Declaration belonged to a
"living tradition,"74 says Ledewitz, but Jaffa "treats the Decla-
270. See JAFFA supra note 83, at 43, 67-71.
271. Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
272. See id. at 43, 67-71.
273. Ledewitz, supra note 124, at 112.
274. Id. at 115.
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ration as a document frozen in time." 75 It appears that
Ledewitz would be more receptive to a theory incorporating the
Declaration into the Constitution if that meant treating the
Declaration as a living document, the implications of which
must be different today than they were for the founders.'
That is, Ledewitz would prefer the late-modem view, to the
imperial view of the Declaration as classic.
The notion of a living and adaptable Declaration suggests
that the Declaration remains an enduring symbol of American
ideals because it possesses the power of a classic in the late-
modem sense. For example, when we say "all men are created
equal" most of us now mean "all men and women," even though
it is doubtful that the language expressed egalitarian gender
inclusivity in 1776."7 We may defend gender equality or some
other contemporary conception of equality as a fair implication
275. Id. at 114.
276. See id. at 114-15.
277. Advocates of women's equality who quoted or alluded to the Declaration tend-
ed to paraphrase it to make it more explicitly inclusive. See, e.g., SARAH GRMKa,
LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND OTHER AND OTHER ESSAYS 38 (1838;
Elizabeth Ann Bartlett ed., 1988) ("Men and women were created equal") (emphasis in
original); see id. at 49 ("God created man and woman equal, and endowed them,
without any reference to sex, with intelligence and responsibilities, as rational and
accountable beings."). Another telling example is the "Declaration of Sentiments"
adopted by the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848. The inspiration for the form of this
statement came several days before the convention, when the organizers decided to
use the Declaration of Independence as the model for their own statement. As several
of the participants later recalled for the HISTORY OF WOMEN SUFFRAGE, "[a]fter much
delay, one of the circle took up the Declaration of 1776, and read it aloud with much
spirit and emphasis, and it was at once decided to adopt the historic document, with
some slight changes such as substituting 'all men' for ing George." THE CONCISE
HISTORY OF WOMEN SUFFRAGE: SELECTIONS FROM THE CLASSIC WORK OF STANTON,
ANTHONY, GAGE, AND HARPER 92 (Mari Jo & Paul Buhle eds., 1978).
Moreover, even if one takes "all men" in a gender inclusive sense, that does
not mean that the Declaration's egalitarian assertion is a statement of sexual equali-
ty. If the generic definition of "man" is male and female in a hierarchical relation-
ship, embodied ideally in a household hierarchy, then "all men are created equal"
means that one man and his household is equal to any other. The married woman
participates in such equality as an unequal subordinate. The single woman is even
further removed from this kind of equality, even if she enjoys greater freedom. Anglo-
American law formalized this conception of "man" for legal relations. "By marriage,"
Blackstone explained, "the husband and wife are one person in law, that is, the very
being, or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least
is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protec-
tion, and cover she performs everything." 1 BLACKSTONE, § 598 at 625-26. The wife,
"covered" in this way (a feme covert), was included in "man" as a subordinate.
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of the Declaration.271 Since the Declaration is open to compet-
ing interpretations, and has been from the beginning,2 9 we
cannot properly speak of its strict logical implications as if
these were to be simply deduced from some singular original
meaning. We can speak only of reasonable inferences based on
a given plausible interpretation. Moreover, the meaning of the
Declaration as a national symbol changes as we Americans
bestow meanings upon it. For example, the Declaration has
come to stand for gender equality because we Americans have,
in effect, bestowed this meaning on the text and thus modern-
ized it. In this way, as Gary Wills aptly puts it, the Declaration
is a symbol that "we have reshaped even as it was shaping
US.
" M8
V. DEFINING THE AUTHORITY OF THE DECLARATION IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
If the Declaration possesses authority for constitutional inter-
pretation, yet its meaning is not fixed, what is the nature of its
authority? Those who recognize the authority of the Declaration
for constitutional interpretation have not addressed this ques-
tion. Nevertheless, we can illumine the issue by exploring ap-
peals to the Declaration by Justices Stevens and Thomas in
some recent Supreme Court cases involving affirmative action.
A. Justice Stevens in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education'
In recent controversies over "affirmative action," Americans
are engaged in a great debate over what sort of public mea-
sures are required to serve the ends of equality symbolized by
the Declaration of IndependenceY 2 An illustration comparing
278. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxix (1993).
279. For example, the expansive black abolitionist interpretation (see supra note
187) conflicts with the minimalist Jeffersonian interpretation (see supra note 185),
although both were plausible interpretations.
280. WILLS, supra note 21, at ix.
281. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
282. For a general discussion of our modern debates about equality and policies to




two opinions in recent United States Supreme Court cases
reveals how the Declaration of Independence has figured in
judicial deliberations in the midst of this national debate.
The first opinion is a dissent by Justice John Paul Stevens in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.' In Wygant, a group
of teachers brought suit against a school board, alleging viola-
tions of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; the board had laid off white teachers while retaining
minority teachers with less seniority.' The board acted pur-
suant to a collective bargaining agreement which provided that
in cases of layoffs seniority would be respected, but not to the
point where the percentage of minority teachers laid off would
exceed the percentage of their representation on the faculty
before the layoffs.2
Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of the Court, supported
the petitioners' claim,' arguing that general societal discrimi-
nation did not provide a compelling state interest to justify the
race-conscious provision in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 7 There must be a showing of past discriminatory hir-
ing practices.' According to Justice Powell, the rationale of
the collective bargaining agreement-that an integrated faculty
makes for a better educational experience for minority students
and thus offsets the effects of general societal discrimina-
tion-might be reversible, allowing other school boards to argue
that segregated classes or segregated faculties should be per-
missible where local experience shows that such segregation
conduces to better academic achievement.'
In his dissent, Justice Stevens challenged this analysis, argu-
ing that there is "a critical difference between a decision to
exclude a member of a minority race because of his or her skin
color and a decision to include more members of the minority in
283. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313-20 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284. See id. at 270-71.
285. See id. at 270.
286. See id. at 284.
287. See id. at 274-76.
288. See id
289. See id. at 276 (stating that -carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black
students are better off with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court
rejected in Brown v. Board of Education.") (citation omitted)).
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a school faculty for that reason."' The exclusionary decision
assumes that racial differences are relevant for determining the
degree of one's rights; the inclusionary decision is based on the
opposite assumption and tends to dispel such notions of racial
inequality. 1 This observation led Stevens to the Declaration
of Independence: "The inclusionary decision is consistent with
the principle that all men are created equal; the exclusionary
decision is at war with that principle. One decision accords
with the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
the other does not. 2 The parallel structure of this formula-
tion suggests that, in Stevens' understanding, the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the egalitarian doctrine of the Decla-
ration of Independence, interpreting that doctrine as equality
before the law. As Stevens has defined the inclusionary deci-
sion, however, it is not simply a mechanism for fostering equal-
ity before the law or in this case equality in the public educa-
tion mandated by law; it is, instead, designed to undo percep-
tions of black inferiority in the minds of any in the school envi-
ronment who entertain that irrational notion.'
Stevens' opinion thus contains two strands of argument based
on different premises. One strand asserts that a changed per-
ception by all in the school environment, including teachers,
administrators, and students, would go a long way toward fos-
tering equal education for minority students. According to
Stevens, the local school board's inclusionary decision was a
reasonable way to foster such changed perception in the inter-
est of equal education. The second strand sees a valid public
purpose in promoting an egalitarian theory of racial differ-
ence' as one of the fundamental values that public education
is to inculcate in the citizenry."5 With that claim, however,
Stevens has introduced a more momentous argument. According
to Stevens, among the "most important lessons" in the Ameri-
can public school curriculum is that racial, ethnic, and cultural




294. See id. at 315-16, 315 n.8, 319.
295. In a note, Stevens described the Court's traditional emphasis on the impor-
tance of public education as a means of socializing citizens to values that are basic to
a democratic political system. See id. at 315 n.8.
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differences are not essential.' The inclusionary decision is,
therefore, also a reasonable instrument for advancing the valid
public goal of using public education to foster a belief in racial
equality.
One can link these two arguments in the following way:
Since all human beings are equal, the law ought to treat them
equally. Nevertheless, it is also possible to dispense with the
premise that all human beings are equal and yet to recognize
the constitutional requirement that the law must treat all its
citizens equally. In that case, human equality is not a constitu-
tional value. At most, one might say that human equality in
the constitutional sense means no more than the equality that
Equal Protection bestows as a right, not any other kind of fac-
tual equality about human nature.
These two ways of thinking about the relation of human
equality to human rights are also found in interpretation of the
famous second sentence of the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liber-
ty, & the pursuit of Happiness.'
The enumeration of "these truths" is marked off by commas,
which give little guidance to the logical relations governing the
three subordinate clauses that follow the first comma. One way
to construe the series is to take the second subordinate clause
as an inference from the first, which makes universal equality
the premise of universal rights. Nevertheless, one can also in-
terpret the second clause as a restatement in other terms of
what "all men are created equal" means, which makes universal
equality not the premise of universal rights but simply another
way of expressing the idea of such rights.
We can infer that Justice Stevens reads the Declaration in
the first manner, which explains his opinion that the egalitari-
an doctrine of the Declaration is in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Stevens appears to assume that if the universal rights an-
296. Id at 315.
297. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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nounced by the Declaration are expressly protected by the Con-
stitution, the premise of these rights, as set forth in the Decla-
ration, is a tacit constitutional assumption. Hence, in Stevens'
analysis of the school board's action, the board was not simply
protecting minority students' rights to equal treatment under
the local ordinances providing for public education, it was also
promoting belief in universal human equality as a constitution-
al value.
Moreover, Stevens argued, this public interest overrode the
harms to the white teachers because the procedures used to
effect the race-conscious action were fair and the resultant
harms did not implicate the fundamental constitutional value of
universal equality.' By this, Stevens meant that the layoffs
of the white teachers were not based on any lack of esteem for
the white race.' One might add (and Stevens may also have
meant) that the layoffs also did not stigmatize the white teach-
ers as members of an inferior race, encourage belief in white
inferiority, or help to perpetuate conditions in which belief in
white inferiority was already entrenched. The white teachers
were harmed, first, because of the economic conditions that
required the layoffs and, second, because of the collective bar-
gaining agreement that furthered the weighty public purpose of
promoting the constitutional value of equality.3"
Justice Powell took a very different view, arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment may warrant in some cases the use of
"race-conscious remedial action" to help "eliminate every vestige
of racial segregation and discrimination in schools," but that
public officials must also adhere to the "core purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment' which is 'to do away with all
governmentally imposed discriminations based on race."
1
These two "constitutional duties," said Justice Powell, "are not
always harmonious."
Powell laid down a two-fold test for working through such
tensions: the race-conscious action must serve a "compelling
298. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 317-19.
299. See id. at 318.
300. See id. at 318-19.




governmental interest"3 3 and it must be "narrowly tailored to
the achievement of that goal."' °4 He then considered two pro-
posed purposes for the race-conscious provision of the collective
bargaining agreement. One purpose was to provide more minor-
ity role models to overcome the effects of societal discrimina-
tion."5 Powell argued that this was not a valid purpose be-
cause the Court had never held that general societal discrimi-
nation alone was enough to justify a racial classification °
and because societal discrimination alone is "too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy."
0 7
A comparison shows that Powell's plurality opinion and
Stevens' dissent operated with different interpretations of the
core meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore,
used different conceptions of what a valid purpose of a race-
based remedy might be. For the plurality, the core purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment is to eliminate racial discrimination
by government. For Stevens, however, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, incorporating the Declaration of Independence, states a
constitutional commitment to universal human equality.ss The
Fourteenth Amendment therefore protects government-based
efforts to promote belief in equality ° and signals that such
efforts do express a compelling state interest, even when they
are intended to overcome general societal prejudice rather than
a specific history of discrimination by the government unit involved."'0
303. Id. at 274 (quoting Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432).
304. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980)).
305. See il. at 274.
306. See id.
307. Id. at 276. The Court went on to note the claim that the race-conscious provi-
sion was intended to overcome past discrimination against minorities by the Jackson
County Board. The Court elected not to consider this contention because it found that
the layoff provision designed to redress this alleged past discrimination was not a
legally appropriate means for that purpose. See id. at 278.
308. See generally id. at 313 (Steven, J., dissenting).
309. On equality as a value to be promoted, see R.R. Palmer, Equality, in 2 Dic-
TIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: STUDIES OF SELECTED PIVOTAL IDEAS 139 (Philip
P. Wiener ed., 1973).
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B. Justice Thomas in Adarand Constructors v. Pena..
Wygant is one of a series of cases that have eroded constitu-
tional protections for affirmative action programs.3" Another
such case is Adarand Constructors v. Pena."3 Adarand in-
volved a federal program designed to provide highway construc-
tion contracts to "socially and economically disadvantaged indi-
viduals." 14 The federal government gave a financial incentive
to contractors who hired disadvantaged subcontractors." One
subcontractor, who did not belong to the class of the disadvan-
taged and who was not awarded a contract, filed suit on equal
protection grounds. 16 The Court ruled that all racial classifi-
cations imposed by any government actor must stand a strict
scrutiny test. 17
Justice Thomas filed a partially concurring opinion in
Adarand to challenge a premise underlying the dissent in
Adarand by Justice Stevens. 18 In his dissent, Stevens argued
310. According to Stevens, the board's race-conscious provision was designed to
serve a compelling state interest in providing an education that inculcates belief in
equality. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315 n.8.
311. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
312. For a review of this history, see Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of
Affirmative Action and the Interpretation of Its Legislative Intent by the Supreme
Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291 (1996); Don Munro, The Continuing Evolution of Affir-
mative Action Under Title VII: New Directions After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 81
VA. L. REV. 565 (1995).
313. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
314. Id. at 205 (citations omitted).
315. See id. at 207.
316. See id. at 210.
317. See id. at 224-29 (ruling that strict scrutiny test already applicable under the
Fourteenth Amendment to state race-conscious actions also applies under the Fifth
Amendment to federal actions). This holding overturned Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). In Metro Broadcasting the Court held that
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if those
measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed to compensate
victims of past governmental or societal discrimination-are constitution-
ally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental
objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives.
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65.
318. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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that "[t]here is no moral or constitutional equivalence between
a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system" and
"[r]emedial race-based preferences" designed "to foster equality
in society." Thomas countered that "there is a 'moral [and]
constitutional equivalence'... between laws designed to subju-
gate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of
race in order to foster some current notion of equality.""9 The
federal program in question, Thomas argued, was paternalistic
and therefore contradicted "the principle of inherent equality
that underlies and infuses our Constitution,"321 a principle
that Thomas found enunciated in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence." Thomas went on to maintain that such "racial pater-
nalism" can have "unintended consequences.., as poisonous
and pernicious as any other form of discrimination" because
they "stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may
cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude
that they are 'entitled' to preferences.""M
Evidently both Thomas" and Stevens" think that the
Constitution in some way incorporates the second sentence of
the Declaration of Independence. Moreover, the logic of Thomas'
concurring opinion in Adarand appears to grant that the gov-
ernment ought to act in ways that are conducive to the value of
equality. In two crucial respects, however, Thomas' conception
of what constitutional equality requires differs from that of
Stevens. First, Thomas rejects the use of any "current notion of
equality" to inform the interpretation of constitutional equali-
319. Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
320. Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
321. Id-
322. See id.
323. Id. at 241.
324. Id.
325. According to Thomas, the Declaration of Independence provides the principles
for understanding the Constitution. See Clarence Thomas, Toward a Plain Reading' of
the Constitution-The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30
How. L.J. 983, 985-87, 994-95 (1987); Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POVN 63, 65 (1989) [hereinafter Higher Law].
326. In addition to Stevens' dissent in Wygant as evidence of his views of the
place of the Declaration in constitutional interpretation, see Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 330-31, n.1, 345 (1990) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
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ty," which is consistent with views he has expressed else-
where endorsing an originalist natural law interpretation of the
Constitution.28  Second, Thomas restricts the federal
government's role in promoting constitutional equality to the
negative task of ensuring equal protection before the law.'
This limited role is also consistent with an originalist interpre-
tation, since the framers would not have endorsed the modern
idea that the government should be engaged in producing
"equality of result."3s
C. Constitutional Ethos and the Dialogical Authority of the
Declaration
Stevens' and Thomas' competing appeals to the Declaration of
Independence assume the authority of the Declaration for con-
stitutional interpretation, yet Stevens and Thomas are led by
the Declaration in different directions when it comes to cases
involving affirmative action. Their tacit agreement that the
Declaration's notion of universal equality ought to be dispositive
in cases involving the government's obligation to protect equali-
ty does not mean that they will arrive at the same conclusion
about how to dispose of such cases. Among the differences that
lead them to opposing conclusions is that they interpret the
Declaration differently. From this, we may draw the following
conclusion: if the Declaration has authority in constitutional
interpretation, it appears that that authority resides more
complexly and ambiguously in an agreement that the meaning
and import of constitutional equality ought to be worked out
through debate over what the Declaration means.
The act of reading constructs the meaning of a classic text
327. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240.
328. See Thomas, Higher Law, supra note 325, at 68 (MThe higher-law background
of the American Constitution ... provides the only firm basis for a just, wise, and
constitutional decision.m" (emphasis in original)). During the confirmation hearings on
his appointment to the Supreme Court, however, Thomas virtually denied that he
was committed to a natural law approach to constitutional decision-making. See Scott
D. Gerber, The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 8 J.L. & POLY 107, 112 (1991).
329. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240. (stating that "government cannot make us
equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law.").
330. GERBER, supra note 106, at 174-75 (contrasting eighteenth century views on
government's role in promoting equality with those of the Great Society).
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such that interpretation can legitimately uncover a text's mean-
ing beyond original authorial intent. 1 Therefore, the authori-
ty of the classic is a shared authorization by the text and its
community of readers through a dialogue in which the text
shapes us as we shape the text. Such a dialogue "with" the
classic is also necessarily a conversation with others who lay
claim to that classic. Hence, in our common claim to a classic
we operate by a tacit covenant to show to one another how we
will share a common identity in the future, through the inter-
pretation of that same classic text. " This covenant exists be-
cause the classic has no enduring authority unless we continue
to fund its claim over us by collectively bestowing value upon
it. The appeal of any one of us to the authority of a national
symbol depends on some natiQnal consensus that this symbol
expresses who we are. Hence, when we argue about the mean-
ing of a symbol, our debates ought to entail a search for some
new shared understanding of that symbol which is to stand for
our common identity in the future.
Those debates are largely antecedent and external to whatev-
er discussion of the second sentence of the Declaration might
show up in one of the Supreme Court's published opinions. The
Declaration is a symbol of our national debate over equality.
When the Declaration is invoked in a particular judicial con-
text, it is one of the competing views from that larger debate
that speaks and not some plain sense of the Declaration itself.
Yet, the Declaration itself does speak, shaping us and our con-
stitutional law. The fact that the "living part"' of one of our
331. On the idea that readers help to construct the meaning of texts and can do
so in multiple ways, see, for example, UMBERTO ECO, THE ROLE OF THE READER:
EXPLORATIONS IN THE SEMIOTICS OF TEXTS (1979). Eco discusses the limits of inter-
pretation in two later works. See UMBERTO Eco ET AL., INTERPRETATION AND
OVERINTERqATION 73-88 (Stefan Collini ed., 1992); UMBERTO ECO, THE LIMITS OF
INTERPRETATION (1990).
332. This suggestion draws its inspiration from the following remark by Gerald
Sheppard regarding the interpretation of the Bible. Speaking with special reference to
the Book of Isaiah and its vision of the law of God, Sheppard likens the Bible to a
"social contract between disparate groups of believers who share some degree of con-
sensus and must seek through the interpretation of scripture to justify how they will
share, in fact, the same Torah [the life-giving and life-ordering law of God] in the
future." Gerald T. Sheppard, The Book of Isaiah: Competing Structures according to a
Late Modern Description of Its Shape and Scope, in SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE
1992 SEMINAR PAPERS 549, 581 (Eugene 1. Lovering, Jr. ed., 1992).
333. See Detweiler, supra note 177, at 574 (explaining that by the antebellum era,
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most revered national symbols is an assertion of human equali-
ty has helped to keep Americans preoccupied with equality.
Hence, the American public takes claims to equality very seri-
ously even though Americans disagree about what equality
means and what role the government ought to have in protect-
ing or promoting it.
The influence of the Declaration in constitutional interpreta-
tion is, therefore, not accurately measured by counting and
weighing explicit appeals to the Declaration in judicial opinions.
One must also weigh the contribution of the Declaration to our
two-hundred year national debate over equality. To do that
thoroughly would require a history of the Declaration in Ameri-
ca, a task which lies beyond the scope of this study. But sever-
al general observations can be made.
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address established the Declaration's
proposition of universal equality as the central ideal of Ameri-
can nationhood. In so doing, Lincoln revolutionized our concep-
tion of the Constitution.' We now interpret the Constitution
as dedicated to equality. The warrant for that is found in part
in the Fourteenth Amendment.' It is also found in the Dec-
laration of Independence, that commanding symbol which in-
spired and shaped the Fourteenth Amendment.' Moreover,
we interpret the Constitution as dedicated to equality because
we regard the Declaration as an enduring statement of our
constitutional commitments. Thus, what Lincoln asserted at
Gettysburg is no longer controversial in the minds of most
Americans. Thus, when a current U.S. president asserts in one
breath that we are committed as a nation to the principles of
"all could agree that the living part of the Declaration lay in the now Immortal' lines
of the preamble.").
334. See WILLS, supra note 245, at 37-40, 146-47. Wiecek, noting that the Decla-
ration has been largely ignored, as a source of constitutional principles, by the Su-
preme Court and legal scholars, comments that "[n]evertheless, the Declaration of
Independence endures as the basic statement of the principles of American govern-
ment ... and it remains today the foundation of our constitutional order." William
ML Wiecek, Declaration of Independence, in THE OXFORD COMPANiON TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 222, 223 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
335. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State . .. deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
336. After the Civil War, the Republican Party largely succeeded in incorporating
its interpretation of the Declaration into the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally
Reinstein, supra note 30.
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the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution,"7 he is
stating what most Americans take to be a truism. The Declara-
tion and the Constitution exist in such close association in our
national consciousness that many Americans assume that the
famous second sentence of the Declaration is in the Constitu-
tion.
The Declaration has become a cluster of concepts whose
meaning we debate, but whose significance is nonetheless some
rights-based notion of justice: "We hold these truths to self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights .... " The ten-
sion in American justice between rights-based and utilitarian
notions of justice means that the Declaration represents on-
ly one of two competing sets of intuitions by which we make
moral judgments. It is significant, however, that so preeminent
a symbol of our national ethos proclaims the inviolability of
individual human rights against encroachment by majority will
or the utilitarian dictates of collective interest.
The Declaration is a dialogical symbol for taking rights seri-
ously while debating what the concept of human right entails.
In this way the Declaration guides constitutional interpretation
by helping to keep alive our defining national preoccupation
with human rights. The Declaration exemplifies the way a
classic keeps an identity alive while submitting that identity to
change. Thus, the Declaration is an authority not so much for a
particular understanding of constitutional rights as for regard-
ing the equal dignity of each person as a central value in con-
stitutional interpretation, the meaning of which owes in large
measure to a common, but fluid, national ethos of "We the
People," who continue to debate the identity, nature, and limits
of those rights we seek together to affirm.
337. See William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Community in Salinas, California, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1425, 1427 (Aug. 12, 1996).
338. See generally, eg., Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in THE
PmLOSOPmCAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David Owen ecL, 1995).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Declaration is a classic in the late-modern sense, a text
bearing a surplus of meaning. That semantic surplus arises and
grows under the logic of the analogical imagination driven by
the fresh questions and urgencies that each successive change
in socio-cultural conditions brings to the fore. This evolving
Declaration helps to galvanize our national preoccupation with
human rights as an activity that defines who we are as a na-
tion and shapes how we read our Constitution. One really can-
not claim more for the role of the Declaration in constitutional
adjudication. But one ought not to underestimate the impor-
tance of the Declaration's brooding presence over debates about
our national identity and commitments. If the Declaration can-
not call specific legal rights into constitutional existence, it does
retain the power to remind us that one way or other we are a
people most profoundly committed to protecting, under the
constraints of social existence, the irreplaceable value of each
individual and to defining the human equality and rights com-
mensurate with that value. The Declaration is no talisman for
deciding constitutional questions involving rights claims. In-
stead it has an antecedent power. It has already shaped us, We
the People and our judiciary, as we have shaped it.
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